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Abstract 
Several governments throughout the world apply policies aimed to re-mediate and recover vacant 
or idle land for other uses. This paper provides estimates of the price sensitivity of redevelopment, 
a crucial parameter for the success of these policies. My cross-sectional estimates measure how 
prices affect long-run conversion of unused or underused previously developed land in England. In 
order to solve the classical problem in the estimation of supply elasticities from market outcomes, 
I exploit school quality information and school admission boundaries to obtain a demand-shifter 
that is orthogonal to re-development costs. Estimation is conducted using a boundary discontinuity 
design based on this instrument. Results show that the probability of re-development is effectively 
sensitive to housing prices. Estimates indicate that a 1% increase in housing prices leads to a 0.07 
percentage point reduction in the fraction of hectares containing brownfield land. Back-of-the 
envelope calculations using these estimates suggest that a large increase of 21% in prices across 
locations, or an equivalent subsidy, would be required to eliminate most of these vacant or 
underused land plots. 
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1. Introduction
Cities are areas of intense land use. Yet it is common to find vacant, idle or underused land
within them. According to Pagano and Bowman (2000), up to 15% of land within US cities
was vacant in 2000. In England, idle or underused previously-developed land sites represented
5.45% of the total urban land in 2007 (Adams, De Sousa and Tiesdell, 2010). This prevalence
is puzzling. Land demand is high in cities; in urban models this is what usually results in higher
densities (Brueckner, 1987). So why are there vacant or severely underused patches of land
in urban areas? Is the presence of these plots sensitive to local demand conditions? Knowing
this is instrumental to understanding how market mechanisms shape urban density and, through
density, the set of associated social, economic and environmental outcomes identified by urban
economists. In addition, it is also informative about the potential success of the re-development
promotion policies which have become popular over the past decades.
In this paper, I provide the first available estimates of the sensitivity of re-development to
local housing prices, a key parameter linking infill site development with market forces. The
analysis focuses on English previously-developed land (PdL) or brownfield sites, defined as
land that was developed but is now vacant, derelict, or has known potential for re-development.1
The empirical challenge to be addressed here is similar to the classical problem of estimat-
ing supply or demand elasticities from observed equilibrium outcomes. To estimate the price
elasticity of PdL re-development I need a demand-shifter, a variable that affects demand but
is known not to affect re-development costs and other determinants of supply. My empirical
strategy will use school quality and school admission district boundaries in a boundary disconti-
nuity design (BDD) to generate variation in housing demand that is credibly exogenous to costs.
Implementation follows Gibbons, Machin and Silva (2013) in combining standard BDD meth-
ods (as in Black (1999) or Dell (2010)) with matching across boundaries. I start by conducting
a cross-sectional analysis to compare the presence of brownfield sites in high price and other-
wise identical low price areas across an administrative boundary. Next, I extend this analysis to
look at land use changes and estimate the effect of prices on subsequent residential construction
activity.
Using a tractable but general theoretical framework, I show that we can think of the elas-
1In the United Kingdom, these are often referred to as brownfield sites. As a result, the terms brownfield and
PdL site will be used interchangeably in the paper. It is important to note that, contrary to the definition prevalent
in the United States, in the British definition brownfields are not necessarily polluted or affected by a hazardous
substance.
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ticity of PdL re-development as deriving from a primitive (unobserved) distribution of rede-
velopment costs. Housing prices determine the cut-off in this distribution to the left of which
re-development takes place. From this point of view, I show that my estimates can be seen as
local estimates of the re-development cost density function. In addition, my theoretical frame-
work clarifies how cross-sectional differences in brownfield presence across boundaries relate to
the elasticity of re-development.
My estimates indicate that a 1% increase in prices reduces the presence of brownfield sites
on a hectare by 0.07 percentage points. While this effect appears to be small, only 1.5% of the
hectares in my sample contained a PdL site in 2007. Back of the envelope calculations using
these estimates suggest that a 21% increase in the house price level across the board would be
necessary to prompt the re-development of most brownfield sites. These results are consistent
with anecdotal evidence indicating that many brownfield sites in England are currently going
through the planning process. Moreover, they are also consistent with estimates of ex-post land
use changes in the 2007-2011 period.
My estimates inform the debate on smart growth policies and urban compactness in urban
planning and economics. A growing consensus among urban planners and policy-makers has
emerged on the desirability of achieving compact cities (see OECD (2012)), cities with high
densities and few undeveloped patches of land within the urban footprint. The increased density
is often assumed to reduce commuting time, promote productivity gains and reduce driving as
well as environmental damage. While the debate over the supposed welfare enhancing effects
of compactness continues (see Ahfeldt and Pietrostefani (2017), Cheshire (2006)) several cities
have embraced the smart growth agenda and its set of recommended policies. In many cases,
governments have tackled this by promoting the redevelopment of brownfield or previously-
developed land. Examples include the brownfield first policy in the United Kingdom which
aims at channelling at least 60% of new developments to brownfield sites. Brownfield initiatives
exist in Chicago, New York, Los Angeles and many other US cities, providing either grants or
financing options to promote re-development. Re-mediation relief for polluted sites provided
by the Environmental Protection Agency in the United States often achieves a similar outcome.
Appendix C provides a review of policies tailored to promote re-development and re-mediation
in North America and Europe. The potential success of incentive-based re-development policies
crucially depends on the price sensitivity of brownfield conversion. With a value of zero or close
to zero, re-development is unlikely, even when prices increase substantially or a subsidy is in
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place. Conversely, positive and large elasticities imply high responsiveness and a potentially
large effect of incentive policies such as tax breaks or re-mediation subsidies.
Results suggest that these policies could induce in a substantial amount of brownfield re-
development. In addition, I show that the price sensitivity of re-development is substantial in
large cities, which are areas exhibiting a disproportionate number of PdL sites and also where
local governments are more likely to engage in specific re-development policies. Using data
on planning restrictiveness from Hilber and Vermeulen (2016), I show that the elasticity of re-
development is lower in areas with tight planning restrictions. Finally, I find that brownfield
presence is sensitive to prices even for relatively high cost sites, such as those in which land was
previously used in manufacturing, mining or physical infrastructure.
This study contributes to the long literature on the estimation of the elasticity of housing
supply. Housing supply elasticities are crucial to understand city-level house price volatilities
(Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz (2008), Paciorek (2013)), city systems’ responses to shocks (Horn-
beck and Moretti (2015)) and urban growth (Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks, 2006). The methods
developed over the last twenty years combine longitudinal data on home-building with city level
price indices (Malpezzi and Maclennan (2001), Green, Malpezzi and Mayo (2005)) and incor-
porate supply shifters such as geographical characteristics and regulation constraints to obtain
city level elasticity estimates (as in Saiz (2010)). These city level estimates are important in their
own right, but they tell us very little about re-development of idle land, as city level changes in
supply may also be affected by sprawl or changes in building heights. The estimates provided
below are, to my knowledge, the first in the literature to focus specifically on re-development
of idle or vacant land. Given that the data on PdL sites is usually cross sectional, I also depart
from this literature in my identification strategy. In this sense, my paper is closer in spirit to
the exercise in De Leeuw and Ekanem (1971), although I propose a more ambitious identifica-
tion strategy by exploiting credibly exogenous variation in demand conditions. The theoretical
framework below will illustrate how cross-sectional and longitudinal estimates are related, and
clarify under which conditions they identify the same object.
My paper also contributes to the literature studying the effect of site clean-up policies on
local housing prices and neighbourhood composition. Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) use dis-
continuities in the assignment of clean-up funding to identify price effects of clean up policies
in the US. Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins (2013) exploit the timing of clean-up and docu-
ment that price effects are concentrated at the lower end of the price distribution. There is
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also evidence of household sorting as a response to these clean-up efforts (Gamper-Rabindran
and Timmins, 2011) and of persistent negative externalities after clean up took place (Kiel and
Williams, 2007). My paper follows the opposite direction relative to these studies, by looking
at the effect of prices on conversion of PdL sites. In this sense, the estimates below should be
an indication of the effectiveness of subsidies to trigger clean-up of polluted sites. The negative
effect of polluted brownfields on prices documented in this literature, stresses the need to rely on
a credible identification strategy which avoids reverse causality from PdL sites to prices.2 These
studies also highlight the potential welfare impacts of re-development in reducing local negative
externalities arising from vacant land sites.
This paper also relates to the literature estimating the effects of new construction on local
housing prices. Ooi and Le (2013) uses a hedonic model to study the effect of infill development
of vacant or underused sites on local house prices in Singapore, finding positive and robust
effects. Zahirovich-Herbert and Gibler (2014) study the effect of new construction and find
price effects are especially high for newbuilds well above the local mean floor area. Again, my
paper flips the direction of causality by studying how prices shape conversion and new-building
at the local level. Finally, this paper relates to studies of urban decline. Both in Glaeser and
Gyourko (2005) and in more recent work by Owens, Rossi-Hansberg and Sarte (2017), vacant
land is a key feature of a declining city. My contribution relative to this work is to look at the
link between demand and re-development in a context in which vacant land is not the result of
general urban decline but of fundamental redevelopment cost differences.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a theoretical framework
used to guide the analysis and illustrate the nature of the empirical problem at hand. Section 4
describes the empirical strategy and section 5 provides cross-sectional estimates of the effect of
prices on conversion, as well as results for ex-post land use changes. Section 6 presents a series
of robustness checks to validate my analysis and its results. Finally, section 7 presents the main
conclusions.
2Given that the definition of PdL or brownfield sites used here also includes non-polluted plots, my estimates
correspond to sites with arguably lower conversion costs than those covered in studies of clean-up effects.
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2. Theoretical Framework
2.1. Setup and Equilibrium
The following static, open-city framework illustrates how cross sectional data on PdL sites
can be used to estimate the house price sensitivity of conversion of into residential use. It also
helps clarifying what is the empirical challenge to be tackled and provide structural interpretation
to the reduced form estimates presented in section 4. Some of its basic elements are borrowed
from Turner (2005) and Glaeser and Gyourko (2005).3
There is a unit mass of atomistic PdL sites available for construction in a city, each of which
is indexed by i. Sites are heterogeneous along two dimensions. They differ in the costs of
re-development ci and their amenity value ai which are observable for all agents. They are dis-
tributed according to a joint continuous probability distribution function g(c, a) which is defined
over a set so that that c ∈ [c, c] and a ∈ [a, a] with c, a > 0. Note that a and c may be correlated.
Profit-maximizing absentee landowners own PdL sites and obtain a reservation return r from
ownership when the sites are not developed.4 The landowner of site i can sell PdL to a devel-
oper in exchange for a price ri, the price of land at i. As shown below, if sites are heterogeneous
in c and a, ri will be heterogeneous too. A given site will be re-developed if landowner can sell
it for a price ri > r, this will determine supply of re-developed land.
Total supply of re-developed PdL is given by LS = 1 − Fr(r), where Fr is the cumulative
distribution of individual site prices r. Intuitively, if the equilibrium price distribution is fixed,
total supply is a decreasing function of r, so total supply is decreasing in the reservation return
of brownfield land. Costs and amenity values do not appear explicitly in the expression of land
supply but their distribution will affect site prices in equilibrium as shown below.
The market for residential development or home building is populated by competitive devel-
opers and has free entry. Developers buy land site i by paying price ri, pay re-development costs
ci and sell the built home for price pi. For simplicity, only one home can be built in every site.
Finally, there is a unit mass of potential residents which may decide to move into the city.
Their utility of moving to site i in the city is equal to total consumption inclusive of amenities:
U(ci) = Ci = ai +w−pi where w is the city level wage rate, pi is the priced paid for a home on
3My framework does not feature housing externalities, which are present in Turner (2005) and Rossi-Hansberg,
Sarte and Owens III (2010).
4The framework is essentially unchanged if costs are made fixed and heterogeneity in supply conditions is
included via variation in reservation returns of landowners. Re-development costs, however, are likely to be a more
important factor in practice so I keep the heterogeneity there throughout the analysis.
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site i and ai the corresponding amenity level.5 As stated above, the city is open so that potential
residents can freely move into the area as long as they purchase a residence there. Alternatively,
they can stay in a different city in the system and obtain reservation utility u. Assume that a
potential resident moves into the city if indifferent. Given that the mass of potential residents is
large, any site with a (pi, ai) combination which ensures a consumption level such that ui > u
will be occupied in equilibrium.
Timing is as follows: land owners simultaneously post land prices for their sites. Developers
observe prices and simultaneously decide whether to buy land, build on it paying the associated
cost and post prices for the resulting home. Potential residents observe posted home prices and
decide whether to move to the city or not. An equilibrium is a set of prices (pi, ri) for all sold
sites and a set of occupied S∗ sites such that residents, developers and land owners are choosing
optimally. Given the timing and the absence of strategic interactions within each group, the
equilibrium is easily solved backwards.
Proposition
A set of prices for re-developed sites P ∗, R∗ and a set of re-developed locations S∗ is an
equilibrium if and only if:
1. All developed locations i ∈ S∗ satisfy ai − ci + w − u ≥ r.
2. All undeveloped locations i /∈ S∗ satisfy ai − ci + w − u < r.
3. For each location i ∈ S∗, equilibrium transaction prices for land and houses are ri =
ai − ci + w − u and pi = ai + w − u, respectively.
4. The total mass of re-developed sites is
∫ a
a
∫ a+w−u
c
g(c, a) dc da
Proof:
Faced with a set of prices P and amenities A, residents’ strategies are a mapping from these
sets into a set of locations µ(A,P) ∈ S ∪O where O represents the set of locations outside the
city. A location in the city is occupied as long as Ui ≥ u, which implies ai + w − pi ≥ u.
Faced with this demand, the developer who bought site i will set prices pi = ai +w− u. To
show this, I proceed by contradiction. If pi > ai+w−u, the house is not sold and the developer
makes negative profits equal to−(ci+ri), so developers would be better off not building a home.
5This simple characterization of household preferences is similar to that present in Turner (2005). Utility need
not be equal to consumption. The equilibrium allocations and prices will be the same ifU(Ci) is a strictly increasing
function of Ci (as in Saiz (2010)).
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If pi < ai+w−u the home is sold with certainty and the developer’s profit would be pi−(ci+ri),
which is increasing in pi. Note that developers could deviate to a price p′i ∈ (pi, ai +w−u], still
sell and make larger profits.
Foreseeing demand by developers and potential residents, landowners will post prices r∗i =
ai− ci +w−u, as long as this price is larger than or equal to r (otherwise they post land price r
and the site is not sold). If they post a larger price, developers would not buy land as they would
make negative profits. If they set a lower price ri < ai − ci +w− u they can deviate by posting
land price r′i ∈ (ri, ai − ci +w − u] still sell and make additional profits. The set of sold homes
in equilibrium S∗ is defined by the set of locations for which ai − ci + w − u ≥ r. The mass of
sold sites is the corresponding integral over the joint (a, c) distribution. This area is illustrated
in Figure 1, which represents the support of g(c, a), the area of developed sites (in yellow) and
the area of undeveloped sites (in gray).
Define si taking value 1 if a site is re-developed and 0 otherwise The fraction of redeveloped
sites, as a function of house prices is E(s) = Pr(p− c > r), where p = a + w − u. The effect
of prices on the probability of redevelopment can be obtained from deriving this expression,
keeping c constant. To simplify notation, define constant κ ≡ w − u − r. If ai ⊥ ci , then we
know that
E(s|a) = Gc|a(a+ κ) = Gc(a+ κ) (1)
where Gc|a is the conditional cumulative distribution of c given a and Gc is the marginal cdf
of c. Note that the second equality follows from the independence assumption. If this is the
case, then an estimate of
dE(s|a)
d a
= gc(a+ κ) (2)
measures the price sensitivity of development.6 To see this clearly, suppose that a and c are
uncorrelated, which each having a uniform distribution defined over a compact support.
6Recall that pi = ai + w − w so that ∂p
∂a
= 1.
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Illustration - Uniform Distribution
If both Ga and Gc are uniform and ci ⊥ ai:
Pr(si = 1|ai) =

0 if ai ≤ c− κ
ai + κ− c
c− c if ai ∈ (c− κ, c− κ)
1 if ai ≥ c− κ
If a > c−κ and a > c−κ, the Pr(a ∈ (c−κ, c−κ)) = 1 and the derivative dPr(si = 1|ai)
d ai
=
1
c− c measures price sensitivity of development. As a consequence, the size of the increase in
the mass of developed homes given an increase in ai identifies the pdf of the cost distribution
(in the uniform case). This is illustrated in Figure 2, which represents different increases in
development resulting from an equivalent increase in ai. In the low dispersion case (when c− c
is small, left-panel), the same change in amenities results in a larger increase in the mass of
developed land than in the high dispersion case (right-panel). Note that the effect of amenities
(or prices) on development depends on the pdf of the cost distribution and not on average costs.
Before turning to how this theoretical framework informs our empirical strategy, it is useful
to highlight how the derivative in equation 2 relates to a policy parameter of interest. Suppose
a local government engages in a policy to promote re-development, providing a subsidy σ to
developers who re-develop PdL sites. In this context, it is straightforward to see that the equi-
librium is characterized by the following statements:
1. Developed locations i ∈ S∗ satisfy ai + σ − ci + w − u ≥ r.
2. All undeveloped locations i /∈ S∗ satisfy ai + σ − ci + w − u < r.
3. For each location i ∈ S∗, equilibrium transaction prices for land and houses are ri =
ai + σ − ci + w − u and pi = ai + w − u, respectively.
4. The total mass of re-developed sites is
∫ a
a
∫ σ+a+w−u
c
g(c, a) dc da
With the subsidy in place, equation 1 becomes:
E(s|a) = Gc|a(σ + a− κ) = Gc(σ + a− κ)
where the second equality follows from the independence assumption ai ⊥ ci. In this case,
note that:
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dE(s|a)
d a
=
dE(s|a)
d σ
= gc(a+ σ + κ)
Hence, we can use the effect of (exogenous) amenities a to estimate the potential effect of
subsidies σ on re-development. Note that a similar case can be made for changes in w. Actually,
changes in income or employment are often used to trace out housing supply schedules (see
for example Saiz (2010)). Longitudinal estimates of housing supply elasticities are easy to
rationalize within this framework. Instead of using cross-sectional variation in a, one could use
time series variation in w to estimate the response of supply to prices.7
2.2. Empirical Strategy through the Lens of the Model
A first empirical challenge emerges because the assumption a ⊥ cmay not be true in general.
For example, in a monocentric city, low amenity areas such as areas far from the city centre may
be harder to re-develop because of reduced accessibility. Conversely, previously developed land
near the center may be more likely to contain larger structures such as derelict buildings, so that
high amenity areas could have higher re-development costs. If the independence assumption
does not hold, then the second equality in equation 1 does not follow. Different values of a may
be associated with different distributions of c. In a regression of si on ai omitted costs may
generate bias, so that it is not possible to know whether the resulting derivative measures moves
along the cost distribution (as in Figure 2) or shifts in the cost distribution. A second empirical
problem is that, in general, ai is not observed by the econometrician. Moreover, prices pi are
only observed for developed sites. A solution of both of these problems is possible if an amenity
qi which is uncorrelated to ci can be observed in all locations. By studying the effect of changes
in an observed amenity (school quality) on prices we solve the second problem. Assuming that
is uncorrelated with ci within certain locations, we solve the first one.
Formally, suppose there are different sets of locations b1, ..., bB in which school quality qi is
observed for the econometrician. In this context, assume ai can be decomposed into an observ-
able and an unobservable component as in
ai = f(qi) + αi
7Recall that κ ≡ w − u− r.
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such that
qi, αi ⊥ ci|b
where function f(.) is strictly increasing, qi is observed and αi is unobserved. If this is
the case, we can use observed variation in qi to estimate a local effect of prices on si, where
the cost distribution is fixed, conditional on the site’s group b, as a result of the conditional
independence assumption.8 We can then use f(qi) as a demand shifter to estimate the price
sensitivity of development of PdL sites. Function f(.) is generally unknown but can be estimated
from observed housing transactions if qi is known.
We can then proceed as follows: i) Using observed home sales, we estimate the effect of
qi on pi using variation within groups only. This yields f̂(qi). ii) Given qi is observed for all
locations, we can obtain predicted prices by substituting qi into f̂(qi) in all locations. iii) Finally,
we can obtain a measure of how prices affect the probability of re-development by estimating
the effect of f̂(qi) on Pr(si = 1) within each group b1, ..., bB.
This framework has a straightforward mapping to the empirical strategy below. The sets
b1, ..., bB are the groups of locations within 1 kilometre of school admission boundaries, qi is
the quality of the closest school to each location. Finally, steps i) to iii) are similar to a two
stage least square estimation in which school quality is used as an instrument for housing prices
(under the assumption that f(.) is linear). Implementation will proceed by using a measure of
brownfield presence as a dependent variable (corresponding to 1 − si in the model) and using
a sample which includes currently vacant or idle PdL sites as well as other areas which may
or may not have been re-developed in the recent past. This requires to add the assumption that
within our location groups (bs) the location of initial PdL sites are uncorrelated to a. The validity
of this assumption is discussed in sections 4.3 and 6.
The framework is also helpful to clarify what is the external validity of the estimates below.
Consider the set Ω = {b1 ∪ b2... ∪ bB}. The resulting estimate of the effect of prices on re-
development will be given by the distribution of ci within Ω, Gc|Ω. It is in this sense that the
estimates will be local. If the locations in Ω are a random sample of all locations then we
will have that Gc|Ω = Gc and the method outlined above estimates the population parameter. In
general this may not be the case and I will obtain local estimates. It is worth noting that this issue
8Note that I have not assumed qi ⊥ αi|b. This is a standard assumption in studies trying to identify the
willingness to pay for school quality. It is unnecessary here as long as the unobserved amenity is uncorrelated with
building costs.
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is likely to be shared by any empirical strategy relying on local randomization or policy-induced
natural experiments that do not encompass the whole set of land sites under consideration.
3. Data
In the baseline empirical analysis I combine data from different sources. Data on previous
developed land sites is obtained from the National Land Use Database of Previously Developed
Land (NLUD-PDL). This dataset was assembled by the Department for Communities and Local
Government from information provided by English Local Authorities. It includes geo-location
(latitude and longitude), site area (in hectares), type of previous use and other characteristics for
each site. I use the 2007 version of this dataset in this paper.9 Sites are drawn as circles on a
plane, centred in the coordinates of each site with radius recovered from the surface area data.
Both the coordinates and the area of each site are obtained from the source. This data covers
PdL sites for all of England.
I use two alternative sources of data for housing transaction prices and housing character-
istics. On the first place I use a data from Nationwide, the UKs largest mortgage provider, for
the years 2002-2006, with a total of 356,369 transactions. The data includes price, date of sale,
postcode and a series of physical characteristics including house size (in squared metres), num-
ber of bedrooms and bathrooms, building age, and dummies for homes with garage or central
heating. These characteristics are filtered out in a hedonic regression to obtain comparable price
levels not driven by structural differences. I also use administrative data from the Land Registry
including the universe of housing transactions in England for the years 2002-2006, with over 6
million sales in total. The dataset includes the date and price of each transaction as well as the
postcode for each property. It also includes a small set of housing characteristics comprising
property type, a newbuild dummy and a leasehold dummy.10 Importantly, the dataset does not
include information on floor size or other structural characteristics of the property. The lack of
information about the property implies that the dataset does not allow to filter hedonic charac-
teristics. As a result, I only use this source to validate the Nationwide dataset and in a robustness
check (see section 6).
9Later versions are available for the years 2010, 2011 and 2012 which are broadly consistent with the 2007
version. I use the 2007 version here because I later use data on land use changes in an ex-post analysis for the years
2007-2011.The 2010 version of the NLUD-PDL is used in a robustness check in section 6.
10In the Land Registry Price Paid dataset property type is recorded as a categorical variable with types corre-
sponding to detached, semi-detached, terraced houses and flats.
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Data on school performance are obtained from the Department of Education, which is the
government department responsible for education in England. The school performance tables
include data on standardized test scores for students completing key-stage 2 education level (11
years of age) as well as measures of value added, teacher-to-pupil ratios, school postcodes and
others school characteristics. County borders are school admission boundaries, so locations are
matched with the closest school within each county.
I combine data on test scores with information on physical land characteristics and other
determinants of supply (potential supply-shifters) including elevation, landslide risk, planning
refusal rates, agricultural land quality, etc. Most of these variables are obtained from the British
Geological Survey. These are used to validate the empirical strategy in section 4. I obtain de-
mographic characteristics at a disaggregated level from the 2001 census. The data is at the level
of 2001 output areas (OAs) which are defined for data collection purposes as aggregations of
postcodes containing roughly 140 households each. There were 165,665 OAs in England in the
2001 census, for which I have the fraction of black and Asian residents, fraction of unoccupied
housing units, fraction of residents employed and unemployed.
In a complementary analysis in section 4.3, I use data from the Land Use Change Statistics
(LUCS) which record the changes in land use as measured in the Ordinance Survey (a British
geographical database) for the years between 2007 and 2011. The LUCS data includes geo-
referencing, approximate area, new and previous use of each site and year in which the change
occurred. I draw the changing sites in a plane, assuming circular shapes centred at the coordi-
nates and radius inferred from the approximate area measure in the dataset.
Finally, I use maps for English OAs, postcodes, English counties (which define admission
boundaries) and Unitary Authorities provided by the Office of National Statistics and Digimap.
A thorough discussion of data sources and dataset assembly is present in Appendix B.
4. Empirical Strategy
4.1. Boundary Discontinuity Design
The empirical strategy presented here is devised to estimate price sentsitivity of re-development
by addressing the classic endogeneity problem in the estimation of supply elasticities from mar-
ket outcomes. Observed changes in the re-development of PdL may be driven by demand
changes or changes in costs, which we can think about as supply shifters. In terms of the
framework above, we want to induce variation in prices induced by observed amenities which is
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orthogonal to changes in re-development costs. For this purpose I implement a boundary discon-
tinuity design (BDD) using school admission boundaries and measures of school quality based
on standardized test scores. This BDD has often been used to obtain estimates of willingness to
pay for education quality as in Black (1999) or Gibbons, Machin and Silva (2013). In my case
I use a version of the specification used in these studies as a first stage in a regression of PdL
presence on log prices.
The objective of the analysis is to study how the presence of PdL sites in space is affected
by local housing prices, so the unit of analysis is a spatial unit. I construct a grid of 100m
× 100m cells (or hectares) within 1 km of county boundaries. For each grid cell, I construct
a dummy taking value 1 if there is any PdL within the cell, and also a continuous variable
measuring the fraction of PdL in each cell. These will constitute the main outcome variables
in the analysis. I then impute data on hedonic-filtered house prices of the closest transaction,
quality of the closest school (as measured by ks2 scores) within the admissions district and
census characteristics from LSOAs. I also compute distance between each cell centroid and the
corresponding council boundary. The resulting dataset contains roughly 1.6 million hectares,
each assigned to a specific school admission boundary and matched with the test scores of the
closest primary school within its county. Basic descriptive statistics for this dataset can be found
in table A.16, in appendix A and details of dataset assembly presented in Appendix B.
Using this dataset, I proceed to estimate the effect of prices on the probability of having PdL
land in a given hectare by two stage least squares, as indicated in section 2. The two equations
are:
ln(Pi) = bi + γSchoolScorei + Countyi + η
′Xi + vi (3)
PdL2007i = bi + βl̂n(Pi) + Countyi + θ
′Xi + ui (4)
where ln(Pi) is the log of prices imputed to grid cell i, bi represents a set of boundary
dummies, included so that the coefficient of interest is estimated exclusively from within-group
variation for properties close, and on either side, of the boundary. These are the groups of loca-
tions referred to in section 2. Given that counties often have more than one boundary we can also
control for county specific effects Countyi. Controlling for county effects is important because
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other policies may vary between different counties.11 SchoolScorei is a measure of observed
school quality which records average point score for each primary school. In all specifications,
I add a set of controls Xi including independent terms for distance to the boundary in the good
(high school quality) and bad (low school quality) sides of the boundary, as well as latitude
and longitude of each hectare centroid. Other controls relating to potential supply-shifters are
included in some specifications. Census characteristics are potentially an outcome of the treated
so my preferred specification does not include these controls. In any case, their inclusion has
little impact on the quantitative findings.
The outcome variable in the second stage is PdL2007i which can be a dummy taking value 1 if
a hectare contains brownfield land or the fraction of brownfield land in the grid cell, depending
on the specification. The coefficient of interest is β, where l̂n(Pi) are fitted values obtained from
the first-stage regression. The interpretation of β depends on the outcome variable used. When
using a dummy outcome, it measures the effect of a 1% change in prices on the probability that a
given hectare contains brownfield land. My hypothesis is that prices have a negative influence on
the probability of having PdL land in a hectare, and the estimated coefficient provides a measure
of the price sensitivity of re-development as discussed in section 2.
The key assumption for identification is that the distribution of re-development costs is the
same on either side of the boundary conditional on boundary effects and controls. The credibility
of this assumption hinges on selecting grid cells sufficiently close to the boundary and assuming
that re-development costs vary continuously at the border. Results are provided for different
spatial bandwidths.
4.2. Matching Across Boundaries
A problem with the previous estimates is that they rely on comparing hectares which are
potentially far away from each other. Boundary fixed effects ensure that estimates are obtained
from within variation only and bandwidth restrictions ensure observations are not too far away
from the boundaries. However, low school quality cells could still be several kilometres away
from high school quality cells they are compared to because I impose no restriction on the
distance between cells. In order to avoid this issue, I first implement a one-to-one matching
algorithm on cells from either side of the boundary. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
11For example, planning restrictiveness could differ between counties (see Hilber and Vermeulen (2016)). How-
ever, I will show below that planning restrictiveness, as measured by the fraction of rejected planning applications,
is smooth across boundaries.
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Matching Algorithm
1. Select the grid cell closest to boundary b.
2. Select the closest grid cell on the other side of b.
3. Attribute a match identifier, and a distance between grid cell centroids to the pair of cells
4. Remove the pair from the eligible cells.
5. Continue from step 1 until all cells are matched for b on one side of the boundary.
Once all matches are obtained, I can estimate a spatially-differenced version of the equations
above, in which all key variables are differenced within each match. Specifications in 2 and 3
then become:
∆ln(Pi) = bi + γ∆SchoolScorei + η∆Xi + ∆vi (5)
∆PdL2007i = bi + β∆̂ln(Pi) + θ∆Xi + ∆ui (6)
Spatial differencing eliminates the boundary fixed effect bi, as matches are obtained within
each boundary. The differenced county fixed effects can now be represented with a boundary
effect as their spatial difference is equal for all cells on one side. Estimation of spatially differ-
enced equations can then follow the standard 2sls procedure.
4.3. Land Use Changes
One possible concern with the cross-sectional methods discussed above is that the school
quality differences across boundaries may be correlated to pre-existing differences in land use
(e.g. manufacturing location) which later gave rise to differences in brownfield presence. Sup-
pose school quality differences where persistent over decades and that the associated amenities
are only valued by households and not firms. If this was the case, then historical land use patterns
could be affected by school quality. The resulting observed cross-sectional differences in PdL
site presence could not be interpreted as the result of conversion but rather as the consequence
of initial differences in land use.12 While this may be of some interest, it confounds estimate in-
terpretation and, importantly, implies that the estimates in the previous sections cannot be linked
to the elasticity of brownfield conversion which constitutes the interest of this paper.
12One factor that mitigates this concern is that school performance tables were only made available in the late
90s.
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In order to address this issue, I first implement a complementary empirical strategy which
focuses on the effect of prices on changes in land use after 2007. For this purpose I use data on
land use changes for the period 2007-2011 coming from the Land Use Change Survey (LUCS).
Specifically, I use data on this survey to identify grid cells where at least some of the land
changed towards residential use in the specified period. Moreover, I restrict the analysis to 2007
brownfield sites as defined in section 3. I use this sample to re-estimate by baseline model as
specified in equations 3 and 4 but substituting the dependent variable in 4 for LUCS07−11i which
is the fraction of land within a grid cell i which experienced a change towards residential use in
the 2007-2011 period. The estimating equation now becomes:
ln(Pi) = bi + γ
LUCSSchoolScorei + Countyi + η
LUCS ′Xi + ξi (7)
LUCS07−11i = bi + β
LUCS l̂n(Pi) + Countyi + σ
LUCS ′Xii (8)
If high amenities lead to PdL conversion, I should find a positive estimate for βLUCS . This
would suggest that our cross-sectional estimates are not driven by differences in initial land
use but rather by actual brownfield conversions responding to amenity differences across the
boundary. In a complementary analysis in section 6, I try to tackle this issue by focusing on
school admission boundaries that were instituted only in the mid-late 1990s.
4.4. Validating the Empirical Strategy
This empirical strategy used here requires that i) re-development costs vary smoothly at the
boundary, and ii) school quality has a sufficiently large effect on housing prices to warrant its
use as an instrument.
As a sanity check, I first show that latitude and longitude vary smoothly across boundaries,
and that school quality jumps when moving from the low quality to the high quality side of the
county border. The graphs, displayed in figure A.7 of Appendix A, merely show that the dataset
has been adequately constructed. As expected, both latitude and longitude vary smoothly at the
boundary and school quality exhibits a sharp discontinuity, with school qualities in the good side
exhibiting roughly 0.6 of an s.d. higher average quality than in the bad side.
I next turn to show that supply-shifters such as physical characteristics of the terrain (eleva-
tion and landslide risk), of the soil (aquifer and agricultural land quality), presence of parks or
gardens, or regulatory constraints vary continuously at the boundary. Aquifers and landslide risk
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are cited as important determinants of sprawl and residential density (and presumably develop-
ment costs) in Burchfield et al. (2006) and Duranton and Turner (2016), respectively. Presence
of parks or gardens may limit access or transit to an area. Land parcels with higher agricultural
yields may have higher alternative use and therefore be less likely to be developed. Finally, plan-
ning constraints can be seen as increasing construction costs substantially and are known to be
an important obstacle to development (see Gyourko and Molloy (2015), Glaeser and Gyourko
(2018) and the references therein). I measure them using average planning application refusal
rates for English local planning authorities obtained from Hilber and Vermeulen (2016).
Figure 3 illustrates changes in supply-shifters at school admission boundaries. The hori-
zontal axis measures distance to the boundary. I identify which side has the highest average
school quality and sort homes according to their side. Positive distances correspond to the high
average school quality side and negative distances correspond to the low average school quality
side of the boundary, respectively. Solid lines represent fourth degree polynomials estimates
on either side, dashed lines correspond to 95% confidence intervals and gray circles correspond
to distance bin averages. We can observe that in general there are no substantial discontinu-
ities in supply drivers at the boundary. In the case of the planning refusal rates there appears
to be a slight discontinuity with refusal rates being roughly 0.5 percentage points higher on the
high quality side of the boundary. This difference is however not statistically significant in a
reduced-form regression.
Table 1 provides estimates of the partial correlations between school quality and the local
supply shifters enumerated above using matching across boundaries as discussed in section 4.2.
These estimates are a necessary complement to the descriptive analysis in figure 3 because they
incorporate more detailed variation in school quality over space. We observe that in all cases the
coefficient of interest is very small and also statistically insignificant in 23 out of the 24 cases.
Take the case of planning refusal rates. The point estimate indicates that a 1 standard deviation
increase in school quality leads to a minute 0.1 percentage point increase in planning refusal rates
(over an average of 26%). These coefficients provide reassuring evidence that supply conditions
do not jump with schooling quality at the boundary.
The variation induced on prices by school quality is illustrated in figure 4. The horizontal
axis measures distance to the boundary, with cells in the low average score side having negative
distances and cells in the high average score side having positive distances. The vertical axis
represents mean prices in thousands of pounds (log scale). Solid lines are fitted using fourth de-
18
gree, dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals, and gray circles represent local averages.
We can observe a clear discontinuity in prices at the boundary, with high school quality areas
having higher prices that low school quality areas a few metres away. There is substantial over-
lap between confidence intervals, largely because I am only using a fraction of the variation in
school quality for this graphical illustration. A formal test of relevance of the instrument is con-
ducted by estimating the first-stage using matching across boundaries, with results provided in
table 2.13 I provide estimates for different bandwidths (in columns) and different sets of controls
and fixed effects (in rows). Across specifications, we observe that school quality is a signifi-
cant determinant of house prices. Point estimates indicate that a 1 standard deviation increase
in school quality leads to an 5% increase in housing prices. F-statistics for the instrument in
question are provided in each row and are all above 20; the instrument is strong.
Note that the effects reported in table 2 can be compared to those provided in the associated
literature on willingness-to-pay for education. The closest paper in term of geographic scope
and study period is Gibbons, Machin and Silva (2013). They find a 1 s.d. effect in ks1 scores
(7 years) increases house prices by roughly 3%, and a similar effect of value added as measured
by the increase in scores between ks1 and ks2 levels (between 7 and 11 years of age). As can
be seen from table A.17, my estimated effects are in this range, with 3% falling within the
associated 95% confidence interval.
5. Results
5.1. Reduced-Form and Baseline Estimates
Reduced-form effects of school quality on brownfield presence are illustrated in figure 5.
The vertical axis now measures the average fraction of cells with some brownfield land at each
distance. Fourth degree polynomials are independently estimated in both sides of the bound-
ary, and gray circles correspond to local averages. We observe a discontinuity in the fraction of
hectares containing PdL sites, with brownfield being less likely on the high price (good school
quality) side of the boundary. Confidence bands are large and it is unclear whether this discon-
tinuity is indeed statistically significant. One reason for this is that we are only using a fraction
of the variation in the data by grouping hectares on good and bad sides only. These can differ
from boundary to boundary, not to mention that there is also variation in school quality within
13First-stage estimates without matching across boundaries are provided in table A.17 of Appendix A and lead
to the same qualitative conclusions.
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each side. In fact, estimates from reduced-form regressions of a brownfield dummy on school
quality, reported in table 3 indicates school quality has a negative and significant effect on the
presence of brownfields at all conventional levels.
In order to quantify the magnitude of the effect of prices on the conversion of brownfield
land, I obtain 2sls estimates, using school quality as an instrument for housing prices. Results
for different spatial bandwidths and fixed effects/controls are presented in table 4. Estimates of
the effect of prices on the probability of finding a PdL site in a grid cell are consistently negative
and significant at all conventional levels. The point estimates are fairly stable, at roughly -
0.09. This implies that a 1% increase in prices reduces the probability of a PdL site by 0.09
p.p. While this effect is admittedly small, it economically significant. Recall that the baseline
average in the dependent variable is 1.45% so this implies that a significant increase in prices
would make a sizeable dent in the presence of brownfield sites. Assuming that the true effect is
indeed linear in log prices this would mean that a 16% increase in prices would essentially wipe
out all brownfield sites. This linearity assumption is admittedly strong, but provides an easily
interpretable back of the envelope figure.
5.2. Spatial Matching Estimates
My baseline estimates are the result of within-boundary regressions. Even when the band-
width around boundaries is restricted to short distances of 250 metres, grid cells used in estima-
tion could still be quite far away from each other. In order to avoid this, I employ the matching
method described in section 4.2 and use spatial differenced data to obtain my preferred estimates
of the effect of prices on the incidence of previously developed land sites.
Instrumental variable estimates of the sensitivity of brownfield conversion to prices for out
matched specification are provided in table 5. The coefficients are still negative and significant
across specifications. In my preferred specification, with a 250 metre bandwidth, county effects
and other controls, the effect of interest is -0.069 (last column, final row). This implies that
a 1% increase in prices reduces the probability of finding a PdL site in a given grid cell by
0.069 percentage points. Note that the baseline estimate of 0.08 falls within the 95% confidence
interval of this estimate given by−0.069±1.96×0.029. Under the assumption of linearity of the
effect of log prices on the probability of redevelopment, this result implies that a 21% increase
in housing prices across English locations would be necessary to prompt the conversion of most
English PdL sites in the long run.
I now turn to the estimates of the sensitivity of brownfield conversion to prices using a
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continuous outcome measuring the fraction of brownfield land in a grid cell. The estimates are
reported in table 6. Estimates lie between 0.03 and 0.04 depending on the bandwidths and sets
of controls, with the point estimate in my preferred specification being -0.037 . In all cases,
estimates are significant at the 5% level. The average fraction of brownfield land taken over
all grid cells within 1 km of a county boundary (including zeroes) is 0.64%. Therefore, our
estimate suggests that a 18% increase in prices in all locations would be sufficient to trigger
re-development of the vast majority of PdL sites. This number is close to the one obtained using
brownfield dummies only, indicating no substantial difference in qualitative results – and only
a minor difference in quantitative results – when incorporating finer spatial variation in PdL
location.
Taken together, the results of the cross sectional analysis reveal that there is substantial
sensitivity of brownfield re-development to prices. Given these are cross-sectional estimates and
that school quality is quite persistent we can interpret them as long run estimates of the effect
of prices on re-development, with short run estimates likely to be lower. This is encouraging
for re-mediation relief and other infill re-development policies such as subsidies or tax breaks
which also depend on the price sensitivity of re-development to be successful.
5.3. Land-Use Changes
I now present results for the analysis of the effect on prices on observed land use changes
over the 2007-2011 period. The purpose of the analysis is to elucidate whether the differences
in brownfield presence documented in the previous sections are simply a static fact or rather
whether conversions continue in high residential price areas after 2007. The sample is now re-
stricted to all grid cells containing some brownfield land. First-stage estimates for the restricted
sample have been relegated to table A.18 in Appendix A and confirm the instrument is still
strong, despite the sample restriction.
The resulting IV estimates of the effect of price levels on land use changes are presented in
table 7. The dependent variable is the fraction of the brownfield cell that experience a change
to residential land use between 2007 and 2011. We observe positive effects across specifica-
tions, with most coefficients being significant at the 5% or 10% level. Qualitatively, this implies
that cells with higher amenity-induced demand are more likely to experience a change towards
residential land use, consistent with the notion that higher prices lead to brownfield conversion.
The coefficients are somewhat unstable across specifications, but this is likely to be a conse-
quence of the lack of precision induced by the small sample, as will be discussed in section
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6. My preferred specification corresponds to the estimates using the shortest bandwidth in the
equation with county effects and controls, yielding an estimate of 0.098. Over the 2007-2011
period, areas with higher amenity values experienced higher rates of brownfield conversion. A
1% increase in prices increases the fraction of a hectare changing towards residential use by 0.1
percentage points. Two conclusions can be extracted from these results. On the first place, it
is unlikely that cross sectional estimates are driven by initial differences in land use. Secondly,
it shows that the conversion of these brownfields takes time, as differences in school quality
were still leading to conversions after the 2002-2006 period in which I measure school quality
differences. The estimated effects are relatively small, suggesting that much of the conversion
had already taken place in 2007.
5.4. Heterogeneous Effects
In this section, I discuss factors that could affect the sensitivity of re-development to demand
conditions. The potential effects of an incentives-based brownfield remediation policy could
differ substantially depending on the location of the site in the city system, the origin and char-
acteristics of different types of sites, or the policy environment itself in the form of planning
restrictions. I turn now to test whether the price sensitivity of brownfield presence is shaped by
these conditions.
5.4.1. Cities
Previously developed land sites occur in urban and rural environments, but sensitivities to re-
development could differ. For example, the cost distribution could be different in these different
areas because of lack of access to employment or road transport in remote locations. To explore
this I study different subsamples focusing only on urban spatial cells, the 20 largest English
cities or the metropolitan area of London. Sample restrictions applied here are based on Travel-
to-work Areas, which can be thought of as metropolitan areas for selected cities, defined based
on commuting patterns.
Results are provided in table 8, where the first row present baseline estimates and the second
presents estimates after spatial matching. In both cases I measure PdL sites with a dummy taking
value 1 if there is any brownfield land within the hectare.14 The first column presents the baseline
and matched estimates that have been reported above for comparison purposes. In column 2, the
sample is restricted to hectares in urban areas based on the urban/rural classification by the ONS.
14Estimates using the fraction of brownfield land in a grid cell are reported in table A.20 in appendix A.
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We see that the point estimates increase relative to those obtained with the full sample. Column 3
reports results excluding London. The point estimates are almost unchanged, indicating results
are not driven solely by the English capital, which accounts for roughly 5% of my sample.
Results in columns 4 and 5 are obtained focusing exclusively on London and on the 20 largest
cities in England, respectively.
Together with the results for all urban hectares, these estimates show that the sensitivity of
unused land to prices is higher in cities. This occurs mainly because the baseline probability of
having a PdL site in a grid cell is generally larger in urban areas. Differences in amenities will
generate very limited changes in brownfield presence in areas which have almost no brownfields
to begin with.15 That being said, it is important that the effect of demand conditions on brown-
fields is clearly present and large in cities given that it is it is usually city or local governments
in urban areas that are more concerned with re-mediation and PdL regeneration policies. An
additional message from the estimates reported in table 8 is that the main results in section 5
are not driven by a few geographical areas. In fact, estimates are quite similar when looking at
other, smaller, urban areas in England too (not shown).
5.5. Previous Land Use
I next study whether brownfields of different origins respond differently to demand condi-
tions. It is reasonable to think, for example, that the cost of re-development is higher for sites
that used to be devoted to manufacturing, mining or physical infrastructure as these may contain
pollutants or require specialized machinery. This difference in the cost distribution could lead to
a difference in price sensitivity. To study this, I split brownfields between those with a manufac-
turing origin and those with a different origin (residential, commercial or other).16 With these
I construct variables PdLManufi and PdL
Other
i taking value 1 if there is PdL of manufacturing
or other origins in a grid cell, respectively. I then obtain separate estimates of the effect of log
prices on each type of brownfield.
Results for baseline estimates are provided in table 9. We observe that the estimates are very
similar for both types of brownfields across specifications, for baseline and matching estimates
and for different bandwidths. For example, baseline estimates of the effect of log price on
the probability of development are -0.043 and -0.037 for manufacturing and other brownfields,
15The fraction on hectares containing PdL in my full sample is 1.45%, while the same fraction is as high as 2.8%
in the 20 largest English urban areas.
16Alongside manufacturing I also consider sites with mining, or infrastructure origin as these are expected to also
have high or very high re-development costs.
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respectively.17 No two coefficients are statistically different from each other. This suggests the
responsiveness of brownfield redevelopment to prices is similar despite its previous land use and,
presumably, the associated cost of redevelopment. The result may seem surprising at first given
that the average cost of re-development is likely to be higher in ex-industrial or ex-mining sites.
However, as discussed in section 2, it is the density of the cost function and not the expected
value that determines the price sensitivity of re-development. So this may rather indicate that
the cost distribution is fairly flat. If this is indeed the case, then a subsidy is likely to have a
similar effect on conversion for different types of sites, which is relevant given that policies are
usually tailored to high cost sites containing or pressumably containing chemicals, pollutants or
heavy structures such as those found in ports or large manufacturing plants.18 Moreover, it is
these sites that are likely to generate the largest negative externalities and, therefore, the ones for
which redevelopment can have a larger effect on welfare. It is encouraging that these sites are
also sensitive to demand conditions.
5.6. Planning Restrictiveness
I now turn to study whether the price sensitivity of brownfield re-development varies with
planning restrictiveness. Planning policy is perhaps the single most relevant policy affecting land
use. Understandably, its link with land supply, prices, or the allocation of land to different uses
has been studied thoroughly. Planning policy can sometimes operate by imposing restrictions to
development. Does this have an impact of the sensitivity of re-development to prices? In order
to test whether this is the case, I use a measure of planning refusals borrowed from Hilber and
Vermeulen (2016). This records the fraction of all applications that were rejected in the planning
process between 1979 and 2008 for all English planning authorities. I use this refusal rate as
a cross sectional proxy for the different levels of restrictiveness of the planning authorities in
different local areas. I split my sample around the median refusal rate and obtain separate
estimates for each subsample.19
Results are provided in the first two rows of table 10. Panel A displays estimates for low
refusal rate areas - areas with low planning restrictiveness - and panel B displays those for high
17Estimates for the spatial matched sample using a 750 metre bandwidth around the boundary. See first and third
columns of the lower row in table 9
18See Appendix C for a policy review including details on site eligibility conditions and examples of government
funded re-development projects.
19I obtain average refusal rates for every group of cells - every boundary - and use the median of that boundary
average to split the sample into a high refusal and a low refusal area. This ensures that grouped bands of hectares
around each boundary are kept together when selecting the sample.
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refusal areas. Columns 1 and 2 provide estimates of the effect of prices on the probability of
finding a PdL in a grid cell. Columns 3 and 4 focus on the changing fraction of developed land
within a cell. We observe that prices affect brownfield presence both for areas with low and
high refusal rates. However, point estimates are roughly 25% larger (in absolute value) in high
refusal rate areas that in low refusal rate areas across specifications.
To incorporate more of the variation in refusal rates in the analysis I estimate the baseline
equation adding an interaction between log prices and the average refusal rate in the boundary to
the second stage. I add in as an instrument an interaction between school quality and the refusal
rate. This deals with endogeneity of the price variable but the refusal rate may still be endoge-
nous and therefore interpretation should proceed with caution. Panel C provides estimates of
both the coefficient of log price and the interaction term. The refusal rate has been normalized
to have mean zero and a s.d. of 1 therefore the first coefficient estimates price sensitivity at the
mean and the interaction term indicates how that changes for a 1 s.d. increase in restrictiveness.
The coefficient on the interaction term is positive in all specifications and statistically significant
in three out of four cases. Looking at columns 1 and 2, this suggests that in areas with planning
restrictiveness 1 s.d. above the mean, the price responsiveness is about 2/3 of the magnitude in
areas with average restrictiveness.
I interpret this as suggesting that planning restrictiveness prevents brownfield re-development.
This also indicates that an incentive based policy for re-development (e.g. a subsidy) could have
larger effects in places with relatively more lenient planning processes.
6. Robustness Checks and Placebos
In this section, I present a series of robustness checks to show my main results are not
driven by i) household sorting in response to brownfield sites contaminating the instrument, ii)
original differences in land use before PdL sites became vacant or derelict, ii) details of the
specification such as bandwidth choice or functional form assumptions, or iv) measurement
error in brownfield location. I also include a series of placebos to validate my results on land
use changes between 2007 and 2011.
6.1. Household Sorting and School Value-Added
Perhaps the most serious threat to identification given the empirical strategy employed in this
paper is associated to sorting of households in response to brownfield sites. Previous research
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has documented the presence of negative externalities for at least some of these sites (Green-
stone and Gallagher (2008), Kiel and Williams (2007)), as well as sorting in response to these
externalities (Gamper-Rabindran and Timmins (2011)).20 Household sorting could affect school
scores, particularly if sorting is income-related and income can affect students’ performance (see
for example ?). In that case, there could be reverse causality from the dependent variable to the
instrument, thus compromising the credibility of our estimates. Moreover, this would bias our
estimates away from zero.
To avoid this potential problem, I propose two potential solutions. On the first place, I substi-
tute school value added for the average school score as my instrument. School-value added mea-
sures increases in standardized test scores between school entry and 11 years of age (between
key-stage 1 and the end of key-stage 2, in the English Department for Education terminology).
Insofar as student household quality effects are already present at school entry, this instrument
will not be affected by household sorting. Results from estimation using this instrument and a
PdL site dummy outcome are reported in Table 11. Results from estimation using a PdL fraction
outcome are reported in Table A.21 in appendix A. In both cases we observe that coefficients
continue to be negative, significant and of a similar magnitude, if slightly larger in absolute
value. Estimates are generally not significantly different from the point estimates using average
school score as an instrument. This is reassuring. Even if value-added adjustments did not fully
account for sorting, we would expect the bias mentioned above to be reduced substantially if it
was present at all. However, point estimates actually move away from zero, and not by much.
In addition, I have estimated equation 4 by using the initial instrument and controlling for
census characteristics of households in each grid cell. Results are essentially unaltered, again
showing that contemporaneous household sorting appears not be affecting my main estimates.21
The next subsection presents additional checks which address potential concerns about historical
and persistent sorting effects of land use and school quality.
6.2. New Boundaries: Unitary Authorities
My interpretation of the cross-sectional estimates in section 5 could be compromised if the
observed differences in brownfield presence is not driven by differences in re-development of
sites but rather by initial differences in land use. For instance, if areas with good school quality
20This literature has largely focused on the United States, where the definition of brownfield requires some degree
of existing or perceived contamination. Perhaps these types of externalities are weaker in the context of this paper,
were most sites will feature no contamination.
21Results not reported but available upon request.
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decades ago were less likely to contain manufacturing activities, this could have led to lower
brownfield presence today after the structural transformation away from manufacturing that be-
gan in the seventies. If school quality is very persistent over time, then this could induce our
cross-sectional correlation even if there was no effect of amenities on ex-post conversion.
As mentioned above, the evidence on land use changes between 2007 and 2011 casts doubt
on this interpretation. But I can further explore this possibility by exploiting the creation of
Unitary Authorities (UAs) by a decentralization reform in the 1990s. UAs are administrative
divisions of UK local government similar to counties in their functions, including those related
to public education.22 Most of these were created in the late 1990s following previous local
authority boundaries. Because local authorities had no functions or responsibilities with regard
to educational services, we would not expect sharp discontinuity in available school quality in
these areas prior to the creation of UAs between 1995 and 1998. Hence, when focusing on
these boundaries, we know initial differences in land use from decades past are unlikely to be
correlated with available educational quality in the early 2000s.
Table 12 provides results for the restricted sample of UA boundaries. Because counties typ-
ically have only one boundary with a UA, I cannot use county fixed-effects when imposing this
sample selection. I only provide estimates with and without supply-shifter controls and for dif-
ferent bandwidths around the boundary. We observe coefficients oscillate around−0.08, similar
to those reported in table 4 for the full sample. This is reassuring as it shows that our results are
largely unchanged when focusing on boundaries where persistent school quality differences can-
not have generated differences in initial land use.23 Therefore, I continue to interpret the results
in my cross sectional analysis as displaying differences in the probability of re-development.
6.3. Bandwidth Choice & Functional Form
A potential concern regarding the robustness of the results in section 5 relates to the choice of
bandwidths. Several methods are available to determine one optimal bandwidth, following the
bandwidth selection literature that has emerged recently. However, it is also straightforward to
reproduce results for different bandwidths close to the threshold and observe whether estimated
effects experience substantial changes. I follow the latter approach here. Panel A of figure 6
22The main analysis includes these areas as counties.
23Similar estimates with spatial matching are presented in table A.22 in Appendix A. Precision suffers because
both the number of clusters and the number of observations within a cluster drop substantially after the sample
restrictions associated to UA boundaries and to matching are combined. Point estimates in that table are around
−0.055, slightly lower but not very different from those in table 5 which oscillated around −0.069 for short band-
widths.
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displays the different coefficients obtained by estimating the baseline specification in section 4.1
under several different bandwidths. We observe the coefficients are stable and slightly above
0.08, as reported in table 4. The coefficient is similar even for small bandwidths of 100 metres.
Hence, baseline results are robust to changes in bandwidth selection.
Panel B contains a similar graph for the coefficients obtained when using matching across
the boundary. Again, the estimated coefficients are negative and significant as expected. The
point estimates appear to be smaller for shorter boundaries, but the difference is generally not
significant. Finally, panel C displays the coefficients measuring the effect of log prices on the
probability of a Land Use Change in the period 2007-2011, as discussed in section 4.3. The co-
efficients are quite stable and between 0.05 and 0.1, with point estimates for smaller bandwidths
being slightly larger. It is also worth noting that this stability in point estimates is accompa-
nied by noticeable differences in the size of confidence intervals, which grow substantially for
smaller bandwidths, especially in panel C. This is in all likelihood a consequence of the rela-
tively smaller sample sizes. Recall that my estimates from section 4.3 are obtained restricting
our sample to grid cells containing brownfield land only. Given that most changes in the signifi-
cance of coefficients in panel C of figure 6 are a consequence of larger confidence intervals and
not of smaller point estimates, I conclude that the weakly significant coefficients in table 7 are
the result of lower statistical power only.
I next evaluate the robustness of my estimates regarding the choice of functional form re-
strictions implicit in the baseline analysis. In all specifications in the paper using a dummy
outcome, the second-stages can be interpreted as a linear probability model. As has been argued
in Horrace and Oaxaca (2006), OLS estimates of linear probability models can exhibit signifi-
cant bias when the average of the dummy dependent variable is either close to 0 or close to 1.
In my case, the probability of having PdL Site = 1 is only 1.46%, so I cannot rule out that a
significant small sample bias may exist. In order to check the relevance of this possible bias on
my results, I re-estimate the baseline specification using the two-step estimator in Newey (1987),
which specifies the second stage as a probit model. In this way, I avoid the somewhat problem-
atic linear specification of the conditional distribution of a limited dependent variable. Results
are provided in table 13. We observe that the probit specification still leads to a significant and
positive house price elasticity of re-development.
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6.4. Measurement Error
Throughout the analysis, data for brownfield locations in 2007 is obtained from the NLUD-
PDL, as discussed in section 3. This dataset records the geolocation and surface area of each
brownfield site as reported by local authorities. It is likely that there is some degree of misreport-
ing by local authorities. That is a first potential source of measurement error which would affect
our dependent variable. A second source of measurement error relates to prices. As described
in section 3, the housing price data used here is derived from hedonic regressions using data on
housing transactions from a mortgage provider and subsequently imputed on our grid cell based
on spatial location. The spatial imputation mechanism necessarily induces some measurement
error in our price measure. Moreover, the data from the mortgage provider may not be repre-
sentative of all transactions, which could result in further measurement error in the instrumented
variable.
I expect these sources of measurement error to have a limited impact on estimated effects.
Regarding the problem with imputing brownfield land to cells, this would lead to measurement
error in the dependent variable only. Under classical measurement error this would only affect
precision, which appears not to be a problem in our estimates. Moreover, the use of the education
instrument to obtain predicted values for prices induces some spatial smoothing which can help
with this problem. Education quality will be relatively smooth in space when no boundary is
crossed. Regarding measurement error in prices, because I use an IV strategy, I do not expect
this to have a substantial effect on my estimates.
That being said, I provide two different robustness checks to ensure measurement error is
not a significant problem in this context. On the first place, I validate the PdL site location data
by obtaining alternative estimates using the 2010 edition of the NLUD. The 2010 data was part
of a three year effort to have a consistent PdL atlas after the last NLUD-PDL edition in 2007.
The broad methodology of data collection based on local authorities is similar but significant
efforts were made to increase data accuracy.24 Estimates using the 2010 brownfield measures
are provided in panel B of table 14 in Appendix A. Estimates of price sensitivity are similar
to those obtained with the 2007 measures, negative and significant across specifications. The
point estimates are slightly larger than for the 2007 data but all fall comfortably within the
corresponding 95% C.I..
24The metadata for the 2010 NLUD-PDl reads “In 2010, detailed reviews of current site intelligence for brown-
field sites took place in several local authorities across England to improve the accuracy, currency and completeness
of data. ”
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In order to evaluate the potential measurement error in prices, I also obtain baseline estimates
using Land Registry prices. These are spatially imputed as above but, because they include all
transactions in England and Wales, the distances involved in spatial imputation are significantly
lower. On the other hand, the amount of housing characteristics present in the Land Registry
data is quite limited so the hedonic adjustment is not as relevant as when using the Nationwide
dataset. Panel C of table 14 indicates our estimates are still negative and statistically significant.
Again, point estimates are almost exactly the same as those reported in panel A using the 2007
NLUD-PDL, and the Nationwide prices.
I conclude from this discussion and the associated estimates that measurement error is un-
likely to have a substantial effect on my results.
6.5. Placebo
Finally, I conduct a placebo exercise to further validate the results obtained when looking
into the effect of local house prices on ex-post land use changes. As has been argued above,
school quality can be seen as an amenity that affects demand of housing in a specific area. While
other amenities such as transport access or clean air may affect demand for different land uses,
local access to good schools is likely to have an effect only on households, and hence, should
only affect re-development towards residential activities. With this intuition in mind I conduct
a simple placebo in which land use changes to commercial, industrial and other non-residential
uses are taken as dependent variable in the specification presented in section 4.3. Results for
this placebo are provided in table 15. Across specifications we obtain small and often negative
effects of house prices on changes towards non-residential use. Coefficients are statistically
insignificant in all cases. The zero coefficients are consistent with the notion that school quality
is a residential-specific amenity. I interpret these results as validating the proposed method to
look at changes towards residential use.
7. Conclusion
This paper provides the first estimates of the price sensitivity of vacant or idle land re-
development. I find that high demand reduces the prevalence of brownfield land in cities. Under
the assumption that costs and other supply-side shifters vary smoothly at the school admission
boundary, my results can be interpreted as evidence that brownfield redevelopment is responsive
to housing prices. Estimates indicate that a 1% increase in local prices reduce the number of
hectares with brownfield land in 0.07 percentage points. Given that only about 1.5% of hectares
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in the sample contain PdL sites, this figure is economically significant. Back of the envelope
calculations indicate that a 21% across-the-board increase in prices could lead to the conversion
of most English brownfield sites in the long-run. Furthermore, I find substantial effects of prices
on ex-post land use changes in 2007 sites for the period 2007-2011.
The results provided here are relevant to evaluate the potential effect that re-mediation re-
lief, tax breaks and price growth can have on re-development of vacant, derelict or underutilized
sites. Results indicate that increased demand-side incentives can have moderate effects on re-
development, especially in cities. I also find that this is the case regardless of the previous
land use of the sites, with relatively higher cost sites such as those previously used in manu-
facturing or mining also being sensitive to demand conditions. Finally, I provide suggestive
evidence indicating that planning restrictiveness has a negative impact on the price elasticity of
re-development.
The notion of decomposing the price elasticity of land supply into its different sources opens
up several avenues for further research. Local estimates such as the ones presented here could
be provided for changing building heights, or development in greenfield land. It may also be
possible to account for externalities across sites and estimate their influence on re-development
in future work. Finally, the empirical strategy provided here can be implemented to study shifts
in land use between commercial, industrial and residential uses.
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Tables
TABLE 1
COVARIATE BALANCE ESTIMATES OF DETERMINANTS OF HOUSING SUPPLY ACROSS
BOUNDARIES
1000m 750m 500m 250m
Elevation Elevation Elevation Elevation
∆ School Qty. -0.269 -0.335 -0.481 -0.554
(0.719) (0.710) (0.701) (0.690)
Landslide Landslide Landslide Landslide
∆ School Qty. -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Aquifer Aquifer Aquifer Aquifer
∆ School Qty. 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Ag. Quality Ag. Quality Ag. Quality Ag. Quality
∆ School Qty. 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Refusal Rate Refusal Rate Refusal Rate Refusal Rate
∆ School Qty. 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Parks Parks Parks Parks
∆ School Qty. 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 789986 610861 420880 219202
Notes: Grid cell level regression using differenced estimates based on matched grid pairs. Dependent variable is
the spatial difference in each variable as indicated in the row heading. The variables are elevation above sea level
(in metres), landslide risk (dummy taking value 1 if moderate or high), fraction of planning application refused, a
dummy taking value 1 if agricultural land quality is high and a dummy taking value 1 if the grid cell contains a
park or garden. Columns 1 through 4 correspond to bandwidths of 1000, 750, 500 and 250 metres, respectively.
All specifications include boundary fixed effects to account for differenced county effects. S.E. clustered at the
boundary level in parentheses.
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TABLE 2
FIRST-STAGE MATCHED ESTIMATES
1000 750 500 250
Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price)
∆ School Score (closest) 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.048***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
F-Stat 67 59 53 47
Boundary Effects N N N N
Controls N N N N
Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price)
∆ School Score (closest) 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
F-Stat 41 36 33 29
Boundary Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N
Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price)
∆ School Score (closest) 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.039***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
F-Stat 33 28 25 23
Observations 600922 464178 318984 165676
Boundary Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: Grid-cell level regressions after differencing within matches. Dependent variable is the differenced log of housing prices. School score
normalized to have mean 0 and s.d. equal to 1. Linear terms for distance to the boundary on either side as well as latitude and longitude
included in all specifications. Boundary effects included for second and third row of estimates. Supply-shifters included as controls in the third
row of estimates. S.E. clustered at the boundary level.
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TABLE 3
REDUCED-FORM ESTIMATES
1000m 750m 500m 250m
PdL Fraction PdL Fraction PdL Fraction PdL Fraction
School Score -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
County Effects N N N N
Controls N N N N
PdL Fraction PdL Fraction PdL Fraction PdL Fraction
School Score -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N
PdL Fraction PdL Fraction PdL Fraction PdL Fraction
School Score -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1350047 1044354 720359 375375
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: Grid-cell level regressions. Dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if there is a PdL site in the grid
cell. School quality measured as average test scores of the closest primary school within the county and
normalized to have mean 0 and s.d. equal to 1. Boundary fixed effects and linear terms for distance to the
boundary on either side, as well as latitude and longitude, included in all specifications. County effects included
for second and third row of estimates. Supply-shifters included as controls in the third row of estimates. S.E.
clustered at the boundary level in parentheses.
34
TABLE 4
BASELINE IV ESTIMATES
1000m 750m 500m 250m
PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site
Log(Price) -0.089*** -0.093*** -0.090*** -0.085***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
County Effects N N N N
Controls N N N N
PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site
Log(Price) -0.089*** -0.095*** -0.091*** -0.087***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N
PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site
Log(Price) -0.077*** -0.084*** -0.080*** -0.080***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017)
Observations 1350047 1044354 720359 375375
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: Two-stage least square estimates. Dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if there is a previously-
developed site in the grid cell. Boundary fixed effects and linear terms for distance to the boundary on either side
as well as latitude and longitude included in all specifications. County effects included for second and third row of
estimates. Supply-shifters included as controls in the third row of estimates. S.E. clustered at the boundary level in
parentheses.
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TABLE 5
MATCHED IV ESTIMATES
1000 750 500 250
∆ PdL Site ∆ PdL Site ∆ PdL Site ∆ PdL Site
∆ Log(Price) -0.078*** -0.083*** -0.075*** -0.058***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.017)
Boundary Effects N N N N
Controls N N N N
∆ PdL Site ∆ PdL Site ∆ PdL Site ∆ PdL Site
∆ Log(Price) -0.086*** -0.100*** -0.094*** -0.075***
(0.027) (0.031) (0.029) (0.026)
Boundary Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N
∆ PdL Site ∆ PdL Site ∆ PdL Site ∆ PdL Site
∆ Log(Price) -0.071*** -0.083*** -0.084*** -0.069***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026)
N 600922 464178 318984 165676
Boundary Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: S.E. clustered at the boundary level in parentheses. ∆ corresponds to a difference taken within matched
pairs. Dependent variable is a spatially differenced dummy taking value 1 if there is a previously-developed site in
the grid cell (2007).
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TABLE 6
MATCHED ESTIMATES (CONTINUOUS OUTCOME)
1000 750 500 250
∆ PdL Fraction ∆ PdL Fraction ∆ PdL Fraction ∆ PdL Fraction
∆ Log(Price) -0.031** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.031**
(0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012)
Boundary Effects N N N N
Controls N N N N
∆ PdL Fraction ∆ PdL Fraction ∆ PdL Fraction ∆ PdL Fraction
∆ Log(Price) -0.039** -0.050** -0.049** -0.045**
(0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018)
Boundary Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N
∆ PdL Fraction ∆ PdL Fraction ∆ PdL Fraction ∆ PdL Fraction
∆ Log(Price) -0.027** -0.034** -0.037** -0.037**
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
N 600922 464178 318984 165676
Boundary Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: Matching Estimates. Dependent variable measures the fraction of 2007 brownfield land
in the grid cell, after spatial differencing within a matched pair. Columns 1 through 4
correspond to bandwidths of 1000, 750, 500 and 250 metres, respectively. S.E. clustered at the
boundary level in parentheses.
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TABLE 7
LAND USE CHANGE & PRICES - IV ESTIMATES
1000m 750m 500m 250m
LUC Site LUC Site LUC Site LUC Site
Log(Price) 0.047** 0.046* 0.050* 0.070*
(0.023) (0.027) (0.030) (0.040)
County Effects N N N N
Controls N N N N
LUC Site LUC Site LUC Site LUC Site
Log(Price) 0.061** 0.063* 0.065 0.121*
(0.028) (0.036) (0.041) (0.070)
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N
LUC Site LUC Site LUC Site LUC Site
Log(Price) 0.059** 0.061* 0.054 0.098*
(0.027) (0.034) (0.037) (0.058)
Observations 16729 12985 8861 4508
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: S.E. clustered at the boundary level in parentheses. Dependent variable is the fraction of
land experiencing a change towards residential use in the grid cell (2007).
TABLE 8
CITIES
Full Sample Urban Only Excl. London London 20 Largest
PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site
Log(Price) -0.080*** -0.112*** -0.070*** -0.352** -0.085***
(0.017) (0.025) (0.017) (0.147) (0.026)
Matching N N N N N
∆ PdL Site ∆ PdL Site ∆ PdL Site ∆ PdL Site ∆ PdL Site
∆ Log(Price) -0.069*** -0.132*** -0.061** -0.354 -0.083**
(0.026) (0.049) (0.026) (0.298) (0.032)
Matching Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: Results for different cities and groups of cities. First column corresponds to the full sample, second column
excludes the London metropolitan area, third column restricts the sample to cells in the London metropolitan area,
and fourth column restricts the sample to the 20 largest English metropolitan areas by size of workforce. Dependent
variable is the fraction of land in a grid cell that is covered by brownfield. In all specifications, bandwidths corre-
spond to 250 metres around the boundary. First row corresponds to baseline estimates. Second row corresponds to
estimates obtained using spatial matching. S.E. clustered at the boundary level in parentheses.
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TABLE 9
PREVIOUS LAND USE
PdL Manufacturing PdL Other Sites
Log(Price) -0.040*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.037***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Observations 1044354 375375 1044354 375375
Bandiwdth 750m 250m 750m 250m
Matching N N N N
PdL Manufacturing PdL Other Sites
∆ Log(Price) -0.040** -0.030* -0.043*** -0.040**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.017)
Observations 464178 165676 464178 165676
Bandiwdth 750m 250m 750m 250m
Matching Y Y Y Y
Notes: S.E. clustered at the boundary level in parentheses. Dependent variable is a dummy
taking value 1 if there is a previously-developed site of manufacturing origin (columns 1 and 2)
or of other origins (columns 3 and 4) in the grid cell. Columns 1 and 3 correspond to estimates
using bandwidths of 750 metres and columns 2 and 4 use bandwidths of 250 metres. All
specifications include county effects and control for supply-shifters.
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TABLE 10
PLANNING RESTRICTIVENESS
PdL Site PdL Site PdL Fract. PdL Fract.
A. Low Refusal Rates
Log(Price) -0.097*** -0.099*** -0.044*** -0.048***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 242004 126072 242004 126072
Bandiwdth 500m 250m 500m 250m
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
PdL Site PdL Site PdL Fract. PdL Fract.
B. High Refusal Rates
Log(Price) -0.068*** -0.064** -0.037*** -0.031**
(0.023) (0.026) (0.014) (0.013)
Observations 478355 249303 478355 249303
Bandiwdth 500m 250m 500m 250m
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
PdL Site PdL Site PdL Fract. PdL Fract.
C. Interactions
Log(Price) -0.072*** -0.070*** -0.035*** -0.033***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.009) (0.009)
Log(Price) × Refus. Rate 0.020** 0.023** 0.008 0.012**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 720359 375375 720359 375375
Bandiwdth 500m 250m 500m 250m
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: S.E. clustered at the boundary level in parentheses. Dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if there is
a previously-developed site in the grid cell (2007) in columns 1 and 2, and the fraction of PdL land in the grid cell
in columns 2 and 3. Bandwidths around the boundary are 250 metres in columns 1 and 3 and 500 metres in columns
2 and 4. Panel A displays estimates obtained with the sub-sample of boundaries with below median refusal rates,
panel B displays estimates for the sub-sample of boundaries with above median refusal rates, and panel C uses the
full sample and adds an interaction term between imputed prices and average refusal rates.
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TABLE 11
VALUE-ADDED INSTRUMENT - DUMMY OUTCOME
1000m 750m 500m 250m
PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site
Log(Price) -0.090** -0.102** -0.101** -0.111**
(0.035) (0.040) (0.044) (0.049)
County Effects N N N N
Controls N N N N
PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site
Log(Price) -0.095** -0.112** -0.111** -0.122**
(0.039) (0.044) (0.047) (0.053)
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N
PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site
Log(Price) -0.100** -0.118** -0.118** -0.139**
(0.043) (0.049) (0.051) (0.063)
Observations 1350476 1044667 720563 375471
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: Two-stage least square estimates using school value-added as an instrument for prices. Dependent variable
is a dummy taking value 1 if there is a previously-developed site in the grid cell. Boundary fixed effects and linear
terms for distance to the boundary on either side as well as latitude and longitude included in all specifications.
County effects included for second and third row of estimates. Supply-shifters included as controls in the third row
of estimates. S.E. clustered at the boundary level in parentheses.
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TABLE 12
BASELINE ESTIMATES FOR UNITARY AUTHORITY BOUNDARIES ONLY
1000m 750m 500m 250m
PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site
Log(Price) -0.083*** -0.087*** -0.074*** -0.079***
(0.023) (0.026) (0.027) (0.029)
F-Stat 54 53 52 48
Controls N N N N
PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site
Log(Price) -0.080*** -0.086*** -0.075*** -0.084***
(0.021) (0.025) (0.026) (0.030)
F-Stat 48 46 44 39
Observations 441596 341965 236265 123505
Controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: Sample restricted to hectares around county boundaries for Unitary Authorities created before 2000. Depen-
dent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if there is a previously-developed land plot in a grid cell in 2007. Columns
1 through 4 correspond to bandwidths of 1000, 750, 500 and 250 metres, respectively. First-stage F-statistics pro-
vided below each estimate. S.E. clustered at the boundary level in parentheses. Baseline Estimates (see matching
estimates in Appendix A.
TABLE 13
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS - PROBIT
1000 750 500 250
PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site
Log(Price) -1.904*** -1.947*** -1.931*** -1.863***
(0.219) (0.226) (0.245) (0.257)
Boundary Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N
PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site PdL Site
Log(Price) -1.760*** -1.834*** -1.777*** -1.795***
(0.239) (0.248) (0.268) (0.292)
Boundary Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: Coefficients obtained by maximum likelihood using boundary fixed effects. Dependent
variable is a dummy taking value 1 if there is a previously-developed site in the grid cell
(2007). Columns 1 through 4 correspond to bandwidths of 1000, 750, 500 and 250 metres,
respectively. Second row of coefficients obtained including potential supply-shifters as
controls. S.E. clustered at the boundary level in parentheses.
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TABLE 14
MEASUREMENT
PdL Fract. PdL Fract. PdL Fract. PdL Fract.
A. Matched Estimates
∆ Log(Price) -0.027** -0.034** -0.037** -0.037**
(0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)
Observations 512465 442023 314978 163428
Controls Y Y Y Y
Boundary Effects Y Y Y Y
B. Matched Estimates for 2010 PdLs
∆ Log(Price) -0.041*** -0.041** -0.041*** -0.042***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Observations 512465 442023 314978 163428
Controls Y Y Y Y
Boundary Effects Y Y Y Y
C. Matched Estimates using Land Registry Prices
∆ Log(Price) (LR) -0.031*** -0.033*** -0.035** -0.038**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 512465 442023 314978 163428
Bandwidth 1000m 750m 500m 250m
Controls Y Y Y Y
Boundary Effects Y Y Y Y
Notes: Matching Estimates. In panels A and C, the dependent variable is the fraction of previously-developed
site in the grid cell according to the 2007 NLUD-PDL database. In panel B, the dependent variable is a dummy
taking value 1 if there is previously developed land in a grid cell according to the 2010 NLUD-PDL database. All
specifications include boundary effects and control for supply conditions. S.E. clustered at the boundary level in
parentheses.
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TABLE 15
PLACEBO - NON RESIDENTIAL LAND USE CHANGES
1000m 750m 500m 250m
Chng.Use Other Chng.Use Other Chng.Use Other Chng.Use Other
Log(Price) -0.018 -0.028 -0.014 0.019
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Observations 22774 17795 12174 6175
County Effects N N N N
Controls N N N N
Chng.Use Other Chng.Use Other Chng.Use Other Chng.Use Other
Log(Price) -0.002 -0.025 -0.019 0.023
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
Observations 22774 17795 12174 6175
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N
Chng.Use Other Chng.Use Other Chng.Use Other Chng.Use Other
Log(Price) 0.022 -0.004 0.005 0.059
(0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Observations 22774 17795 12174 6175
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: Dependent variable is the fraction of the grid cell that experienced a change towards a non-
residential use (commercial, industrial, etc.) in the period 2007-2011. Sample restricted to hectares
containing PdL in 2007. Columns 1 through 4 correspond to bandwidths of 1000, 750, 500 and 250
metres, respectively. S.E. clustered at the boundary level in parentheses.
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Figures
FIGURE 1
RE-DEVELOPMENT REGION ON THE (a,c) SPACE
a
a
a
c c c
a=c− κRe-developed Sites
a ≥ c− κ
Undeveloped
Sites
Note: Horizontal axis corresponds to re-development costs, drawn within the support [c, c].
Vertical axis corresponds to amenity values within the support [a, a]. Constant κ is defined as
κ ≡ w − u− r.
FIGURE 2
RE-DEVELOPMENT REGION CONDITIONAL ON a (UNIFORM CASE)
c
gc
0 c cai − κ
Low Dispersion
c
gc
0 c cai − κ
High Dispersion
Note: Horizontal axis corresponds to re-development costs. Vertical axis corresponds to gc, the
marginal pdf of c. Under the assumption ai ⊥ ci, then gc|a is the same for different levels of a.
The left panel represents the case in which the variance of c is low, the right-panel represents the
high variance case. The black patterned rectangle represent the additional development resulting
from an increase in ai of the same magnitude in both cases.
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FIGURE 3
COVARIATE BALANCE FOR DETERMINANTS OF HOUSING SUPPLY
Notes: Negative distances to boundary correspond to grid cells with low average school quality and positive dis-
tances to boundary correspond to grid cells with high school quality. Vertical axis corresponds to elevation above
sea level (top-left), a landslide risk (top right), probability of aquifer presence (centre left), probability of a park or
garden in the cell (centre right), probability of high agricultural land quality (bottom left) and refusal rates (bottom
right). Third degree polynomials fitted on the raw data represented in solid lines on either side of the boundary.
95% confidence intervals in dashed lines, with standard errors clustered at the boundary level. Bubbles correspond
to averages taken within 40 distance bins.
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FIGURE 4
FIRST-STAGE ILLUSTRATION
Notes: Negative distances to boundary correspond to counties with low average school quality and positive dis-
tances to boundary correspond to counties with high school quality. Third degree polynomials fitted on the raw data
represented in solid lines. 95% confidence intervals in dashed lines, with standard errors clustered at the boundary
level.
FIGURE 5
REDUCED-FORM GRAPH
Notes: Horizontal axis represents distance to the boundary with negative distances corresponding to the county
with low average school quality and positive distances corresponding to the county with high average school qual-
ity. Fourth degree polynomials fitted on the raw data represented in solid lines. Reduced-form estimates when
incorporating intensive margin variation in school quality can be found in table 3 in Appendix A.
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FIGURE 6
COEFFICIENTS BY BANDWIDTH
(A) BASELINE ESTIMATES FOR DIFFERENT BANDWIDTHS
(B) MATCHED ESTIMATES FOR DIFFERENT BANDWIDTHS
(C) LAND USE CHANGE ESTIMATES FOR DIFFERENT BANDWIDTHS
Notes: Panel A: Baseline estimates for different bandwidths using a continuous outcome (see section 4.1). Panel
B: Matching estimates for different bandwidths using a continuous outcome (see section 4.2). Panel C: Land use
change estimates for different bandwidths using a continuous outcome (see section 4.3). Parameter values indicated
in the vertical axis. Bandwidths indicated in the horizontal axis. Baseline and land use change specifications include
county fixed effects. Matching specification includes boundary fixed effects. 95% confidence intervals represented
in vertical lines.
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Appendices
A. Additional Tables and Figures
This Appendix presents a series of tables and figures complementing those in the main text.
These includes descriptive tables, matching or baseline estimates and results for alternative out-
come variables.
TABLE A.16
DESCRIPTIVES - CENSUS AREA LEVEL DATA
Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Any Brownfile in this cell (Dummy) 2007 0.015 0.120 0 1
Fraction Brownfiled in this cell (2007) 0.006 0.071 0 1
LUCS Site. To Residential 0.021 0.142 0 1
School Score 27.956 1.448 21.500 31.850
Latitude 52.529 1.127 50.332 55.188
Longitude -1.377 1.095 -4.549 1.739
Elevation above sea level 96.423 84.406 -10.000 570.000
House Price (Smoothed) 141703 56145 13268 1477636
Population (2001 census) 1588 310 1000 4569
Observations 1,566,798
Notes: Descriptive statistics for the full sample. Grid cells (hectares) within 1 km of a county (school admission)
boundary.
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TABLE A.17
FIRST-STAGE BASELINE ESTIMATES
1000m 750m 500m 250m
Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price)
School Score 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 0.059***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
County Effects N N N N
Controls N N N N
Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price)
School Score 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.057***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N
Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price)
School Score 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.055***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 1350047 1044354 720359 375375
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: Grid-cell level regressions. Dependent variable is the log of housing prices imputed to a hectare. School
score normalized to have mean 0 and s.d. equal to 1. Boundary fixed effects and separate linear terms for distance
to the boundary on either side, latitude and longitude included in all specifications. Other fixed effects and controls
as indicated in the table S.E. clustered at the boundary level in parentheses.
50
FIGURE A.7
COVARIATE BALANCE (SANITY-CHECK)
Notes: Distance to boundary represented in the horizontal axis. Negative distances to boundary correspond to
grid cells with low average school quality and positive distances to boundary correspond to grid cells with high
school quality. Vertical axis corresponds to latitude (top panel), longitude (middle panel) and closest school quality
(bottom panel). Third degree polynomials fitted on the raw data represented in solid lines on either side of the
boundary. 95% confidence intervals in dashed lines, with standard errors clustered at the boundary level. Gray
circles correspond to averages taken within 40 distance bins.
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TABLE A.18
FIRST-STAGE: LUCS SAMPLE
1000m 750m 500m 250m
Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price)
School Score 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.040***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012)
County Effects N N N N
Controls N N N N
Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price)
School Score 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.032**
(0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012)
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N
Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price) Log(Price)
School Score 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.045*** 0.042***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Observations 16729 12985 8861 4508
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: Grid-cell level regressions. Sample restricted to cells containing brownfield land in 2007. Dependent
variable is the log of housing prices. School score normalized to have mean 0 and s.d. equal to 1. Boundary fixed
effects and separate linear terms for distance to the boundary on either side as well as latitude and longitude
included in all specifications. County effects included for second and third row of estimates. Supply-shifters
included as controls in the third row of estimates. S.E. clustered at the boundary level in parentheses.
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TABLE A.19
BASELINE ESTIMATES (FRACTION OF BROWNFIELD IN GRID CELL)
1000m 750m 500m 250m
PdL Fraction PdL Fraction PdL Fraction PdL Fraction
Log(Price) -0.041*** -0.044*** -0.043*** -0.041***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
County Effects N N N N
Controls N N N N
PdL Fraction PdL Fraction PdL Fraction PdL Fraction
Log(Price) -0.043*** -0.047*** -0.045*** -0.044***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N
PdL Fraction PdL Fraction PdL Fraction PdL Fraction
Log(Price) -0.036*** -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.038***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 1350047 1044354 720359 375375
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: Baseline estimates. Dependent variable measures the fraction of 2007 brownfield land in the grid cell.
Boundary fixed effects and separate linear terms for distance to the boundary on either side as well as latitude and
longitude included in all specifications. Columns 1 through 4 correspond to bandwidths of 1000, 750, 500 and 250
metres, respectively. S.E. clustered at the boundary level in parentheses.
TABLE A.20
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS - CITIES (FRACTION)
Full Sample Urban Only Excl. London London 20 Largest
PdL Fract. PdL Fract. PdL Fract. PdL Fract. PdL Fract.
Log(Price) -0.038*** -0.050*** -0.033*** -0.221*** -0.044***
(0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.085) (0.015)
Matching N N N N N
∆ PdL Fract. ∆ PdL Fract. ∆ PdL Fract. ∆ PdL Fract. ∆ PdL Fract.
∆ Log(Price) -0.037** -0.060** -0.033** -0.234 -0.043*
(0.016) (0.030) (0.016) (0.175) (0.022)
Matching Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: First column corresponds to the full sample, second column excludes the London metropolitan area, third
column restricts the sample to cells in the London metropolitan area, and fourth column restricts the sample to the
20 largest English metropolitan areas by size of workforce. Dependent variable is the fraction of land in a grid cell
that is covered by brownfield. All bandwidths correspond to 250 metres measured as distance to the boundary.
First panel corresponds to baseline estimates. Second panel corresponds to estimates obtained using spatial
matching. S.E. clustered at the boundary level in parentheses.
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TABLE A.21
VALUE-ADDED INSTRUMENT - CONTINUOUS OUTCOME
1000m 750m 500m 250m
PdL Fraction PdL Fraction PdL Fraction PdL Fraction
Log(Price) -0.038* -0.047** -0.050* -0.065**
(0.019) (0.023) (0.026) (0.030)
County Effects N N N N
Controls N N N N
PdL Fraction PdL Fraction PdL Fraction PdL Fraction
Log(Price) -0.049** -0.059** -0.061** -0.077**
(0.023) (0.027) (0.029) (0.034)
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls N N N N
PdL Fraction PdL Fraction PdL Fraction PdL Fraction
Log(Price) -0.051** -0.061** -0.066** -0.085**
(0.025) (0.029) (0.032) (0.039)
Observations 1350476 1044667 720563 375471
County Effects Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: Two-stage least square estimates using school value-added as an instrument for prices. Dependent variable
measures the fraction of 2007 brownfield land in the grid cell. Boundary fixed effects and linear terms for distance to
the boundary on either side as well as latitude and longitude included in all specifications. County effects included
for second and third row of estimates. Supply-shifters included as controls in the third row of estimates. S.E.
clustered at the boundary level in parentheses.
54
TABLE A.22
SPATIAL-MATCHING ESTIMATES FOR UNITARY AUTHORITY BOUNDARIES
1000 750 500 250
∆ PdL Site ∆ PdL Site ∆ PdL Site ∆ PdL Site
∆ Log(Price) -0.066** -0.063* -0.056* -0.056*
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.031)
F-Stat 22 22 20 17
Controls N N N N
∆ PdL Site ∆ PdL Site ∆ PdL Site ∆ PdL Site
∆ Log(Price) -0.063* -0.063* -0.053 -0.052
(0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.034)
F-Stat 20 20 18 15
Observations 191965 167164 119622 62022
Controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: Grid cell level regression using differenced estimates based on matched grid pairs. Sample restricted to
boundaries of Unitary Authorities created between 1995 and 2000. Dependent variable is the spatial difference in
dummies taking value 1 if there is previously-developed land in a grid cell. Columns 1 through 4 correspond to
bandwidths of 1000, 750, 500 and 250 metres, respectively. S.E. clustered at the boundary level in parentheses.
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B. Data Sources and Dataset Assembly
B.1. Data Sources
Data on previously-developed land sites is obtained from the National Land Use Database
of Previously Developed Land (NLUD-PDL). Most of the analysis uses the 2007 version of
the database which was published by the Department of Communities and Local Government
in 2008, and is currently held at the UK National Archives. Later versions of the database were
released in 2010, 2011 and 2012. I use 2010 in a validation exercise in section 6.4.
Data on housing transactions is obtained from Nationwide, a British building society and
one of the largest providers of household mortgages in the United Kingdom. The advantage
of this dataset lies in that it includes detailed housing characteristics which allow to control for
structural attributes of the property in a hedonic regression before spatial imputation of prices
to grid cells. Section 6.4 shows that, using alternative data from the Price Paid database made
public by the Land Registry leads to comparable results.25
Data on school quality is obtained from the school performance tables, made available by
the Department of Education at https://www.gov.uk/school-performance-tables. These includes
several measures of school quality for primary schools in England and Wales.
Data on land use changes is obtained from the Land Use Change Database (LUCS). This
data is available since 1985 and 2011. While land use change statistics exist for the period after
2011, there was a substantial methodological break in the regular surveys that year. That is why
I focus on land changes in the period 2007-2011 only in section 4.3. Trends in land use changes
for the sample period can be found at “Land Use Change Statistics in England: 2011” published
by the Department for Communities and Local Government. 26
Variables for potential supply shifters, used as controls in most specifications and in the
balancing tests displayed in table 1 and figure 3 are obtained from different sources. The data
on elevation above sea level is based on a combination of Ordinance Survey Terrain 50 which
records elevation data for the British territory in a 50 metre grid, imputed to postcodes based on
their centroids. The postcode grid-cell match in my dataset is based on spatial assignment based
on postcode centroids. The landslide risk measure and the data on underground aquifers are
obtained from the British Geological Survey. In the case of the landslide risk, it is specifically
25Data produced by Land Registry c© Crown copyright 2015.
26See https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/267551/LUCS_Stats_Release__Dec_2013_FINAL_.pdf.
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obtained from the GeoSure 5km Hexagonal Grid. The data on aquifers is obtained from the Hy-
drogeogology map (scale 1:625,000) and spatially matched with grid cell centroids. The aquifer
variable used here takes value 1 if the grid cell centroid falls in an aquifer identified as “highly
productive”. Data on agricultural land quality is based on the 1988 Agricultural Land Classifi-
cation of England and Wales, elaborated by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and
the Welsh Office Agriculture Department at the time. Data on the location of registered parks
and gardens is obtained from the Historic England shapefile recording these locations. Historic
England is a public body devoted to caring about England’s historic environment. Spatial impu-
tation of parks and gardens to grid cells is again based on grid cell centroids. Data on planning
application average refusal rates at the local planning authority level for the period 1979-2008
obtained from Hilber and Vermeulen (2016).
B.2. Dataset Assembly
The dataset assembly in this study relied heavily on combining spatial data using Geographic
Information Systems. The basic process involved several steps. On the first place, I use a
shapefile of counties (polygons) to obtain county boundaries (lines). I build a buffer area of 1km
around those boundaries and create a grid of hectares within those buffer areas. Boundaries with
the sea or boundaries against Wales or Scotland are removed from the sample. The resulting
grid cell constitutes my sample, with each hectare-cell being one observation (see panel A of
Figure B.8).
The next step is to impose the location of brownfield sites. As discussed above, these are
created as circular polygons around the centroids reported in the NLUD-PDL data. An overlay
identifies which grid cells contain brownfield land and which do not (see panel B of Figure B.8).
I next impute the hedonic-filtered prices and the school quality to each hectare by imputing these
variables based on closeness within the corresponding county, as county boundaries are operate
as admission boundaries in this context (see panel C of Figure B.8).
Other variables such as those recording potential supply shifters or census characteristics are
imputed using grid cell centroids. I remove from the analysis all grid cells that are crossed by a
county boundary.
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FIGURE B.8
DATASET ASSEMBLY
(A) COUNTY BOUNDARY AND HECTARE GRID
(B) OVERLAY OF BROWNFIELD LOCATIONS
(C) IMPUTING SMOOTHED HOUSING PRICES AND SCHOOLS
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C. Re-Development Policies for Brownfield and Previously Developed Sites
Idle or vacant land plots within cities, often containing the remnants of previous develop-
ments, are a common feature of cities worldwide. While an internationally harmonized def-
inition for previously developed unused or underused sites is not available, several individual
studies bare witness to this fact. In England, Adams, De Sousa and Tiesdell (2010) claim pre-
viously developed sites amount to 5.45% of total urban developed land. In the Greater London
area alone, there are over 2000 hectares of land identified as brownfield sites with potential for
redevelopment.27 Estimates from the European Commission indicate there are over 3 million
brownfield sites across Europe located and well connected to urban boundaries, with 500,000
hectares of brownfield land estimated to be available for development (Comission, 2013).
In the case of the United States, up to 15% of urban land is classified as vacant (Pagano
and Bowman, 2000). The US definition of brownfields is restricted only to property where
expansion, redevelopment or reuse may be complicated by “the presence or potential presence
of a hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant”.28 The EPA estimates that there are over
450,000 brownfields in the USA according to this definition, though some authors increase the
figure to over 1 million, covering 6% of urban areas (Adams, De Sousa and Tiesdell, 2010).
There are several types of policies deployed to promote the development of vacant land,
previously developed land and contaminated sites within cities. The policies themselves vary
substantially by jurisdiction, because of, among other things, the different administrative frame-
works applying to these sites. Policy objectives encompass the urban densification, clean-up of
contaminated sites (especially, but not exclusively, in the US) and removing financial barriers to
re-development. The policies themselves can be classified into four broad categories:
1. Grants and Subsidies such as clean-up grants
2. Financial Instruments such as low interest loans to developers.
3. Public Ownership schemes in which local governments buy the land, conduct part of the
re-development efforts and sell it out to developers.
4. Differential Planning schemes aiming to target new developments to previously developed
sites.
27Calculations based on data from the London Brownfields Sites Review, accesible at https://data.
london.gov.uk/dataset/london-brownfield-sites-review.
28EPA’s Brownfields and Land revitalization Programs. Properties with New Purpose. https://www.epa.
gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/oblr_brochure_weblayout_508.pdf
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I use this taxonomy to classify the most salient brownfield policies in North America and
Europe. This policy review is not meant to be exhaustive. It provides an overview of the policy
levers currently in use for this purpose. As I will argue below, many of these policies can be
linked, in one form or another, to the sensitivity of re-development to demand conditions.
Grants and Subsidies
Grants and subsidies for clean up of pollutants, as well as for redevelopment of derelict sites
are one common mechanism to foster brownfield conversion. Low interest loan can be also seen
as a form of subsidy, but will be treated separately. I provide three examples here for the United
Kingdom and the United States. Other state and city level programs are available in the USA
(e.g. Los Angele’s Citywide Brownfields Program, City of Chicago’s Brownfield Initiative).
United Kingdom - Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs (DEFRA)
DEFRA funding had been available for local authorities from 2000 until 2017. The amount
of funding available peaked at GBP 17.5 million in 2009-2010 and was gradually faced out
until 2017. The funding was made available via small grants with an average value of GBP
38,000. This was directed to clean up and other remediation activities carried out jointly by
local authorities and land owners/occupiers who provided 17% of all funding for remediation
efforts in this context. The phase out of the program has led to discussions about the ability
of English local governments to meet their statutory obligations in aiding the process of land
remediation. 29
United States - Environmental Protection Agency Grants
The EPA is the primary enforcer of environmental statutes and regulations in the United
States. EPA has launched the Brownfields and Land Revitalization Programs to revitalize con-
taminated land and return properties to productive use.
There are broadly two types of grants, Assessment grants and Clean Up grants. Both can
fund up to 200,000 USD for plans lasting up to 3 years. The Assessment grants are meant to
fund evaluation of clean up costs, including detection of hazardous substances on site. Clean up
grants apply only to sites owned by the grantee and can only cover up to 80% of the total clean up
costs. The EPA also runs an area-wide planning grant program directed to local governments, in
their role as planning authorities, which is meant to aid in the development of planning processes
29For further reference see https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmenvaud/180/18005.htm.
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to assess, clean and reuse brownfield sites.
The 2016 budget of the EPA’s Brownfield programs amounted to 110 million USD funding
over 151 cooperative programs with municipalities, clean up costs over 142 sites and assess-
ments for over 3000 sites. The EPA also provides technical assistance to lower level government
bodies.30 The assessment and clean-up grants can be seen as subsidies for re-development, and
interpreted in the context of the framework laid out in section 2.
New York - Brownfield Opportunity Areas (BOA) Program
The BOA program was launched in 2003 through the New York (NY) State Brownfields
Reform Act and is administered by the NY State Department. It is targeted to brownfield rede-
velopment in poor communities and provides grants of up to 90% of the eligible project costs
to finalise revitalization plans and ultimately lead to brownfield re-development. The goal is
to reduce re-development costs by removing uncertainty regarding site conditions, ownership
structure or future feasible uses. Eligible applicants are not private developers but rather mu-
nicipal governments and community-based organizations. That being said, the program also
includes a 2% tax credit bonus for proposed development projects on sites that are part of the
program. Note that, in terms of net present value of a project, a tax credit operates as a subsidy.
The budget allocated to this program has varies substantially over the years, from 32 million
USD in 2011 to 45 million in 2016. The program is still operational. A formal evaluation of the
effect of this program on nearby housing prices was conducted in Cohen et al. (2016).
Financial Instruments
The supply of appropriate financial instruments to promote brownfield and infill re-development
has been a popular policy approach, especially in the European Union. These provide both low-
interest conventional loans as well as equity loans and other financial engineering tools.
European Union - Joint European Support for Sustainable Investment in City Areas (JESSICA)
JESSICA is a European Comission initiative developed jointly with the European Invest-
ment Bank and the Council of Europe development Bank to support urban development and
urban regeneration schemes. The initiative is implemented as part of the European Regional
Development Fund. The objective of the policy is to provide financial assistance in the form
30For further referent visit https://www.epa.gov/brownfields/
overview-brownfields-program and https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/
2015-02/documents/fy_2016_bib_combined_v5.pdf.
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of equity, loans or guarantees channelled through public-private partnerships. This is meant to
cover insufficient availability of equity from private investors, or to compensate for low returns
that need to be leveraged to attract private investors (due to contamination of property or poor
local infrastructure). Guarantees are meant to enable developers and other private participants
to secure funding from third parties (e.g. banks). Potential proceeds from these financing oper-
ations are meant to be re-invested in new urban development projects.
European Union - GINGKO Fund
European Investment Bank and Edmond de Rothschild Group funding dedicated to acquir-
ing a portfolio of brownfield sites, including also other private investors. The goal of the fund
is to signal investment appeal to other private equity funds interested in regeneration and rede-
velopment of brownfield sites in its role as an environmental remediation specialist. It conducts
supplementary environmental conditions studies before acquisition and analyses economic fea-
sibility of operations to bolster its signalling effect. The fund’s activity has been mostly concen-
trated in Belgium and France where most redevelopment has been publicly led. The total assets
in the fund amounted to 140 million euros in 2016. The actions of GINGKO fund can be seen
as reducing actual and perceived costs or re-development for investors.31
California Environmental Protection Agency: Brownfields Initiative
California’s environmental authority in charge of restoring, protecting and enhancing the
environment launched the initiative to remedy brownfields. The policy consists of a fund meant
to provide low cost loans to developers, property owners, NGOs and local government agencies
which own brownfield sites with potential for redevelopment. The budget consists of 2.7 million
USD available for low interest loans which operate both as a financing tool and as an effective
subsidy given the low rates. Government and non-for profits can only request loans up to USD
200,000.
An example of a development using these funds is the Third Street Project in the South
Market Area in San Francisco. The program provided a 1.6 million USD loan used to clean-up
lead contamination of the soil in the site.32
31For further information please see http://www.eib.org/infocentre/publications/all/eib-information-1-2011-
n141.htm.
32For further information, see http://www.dtsc.ca.gov/SiteCleanup/Brownfields/Loans_
Grants.cfm.
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Public Ownership
In some jurisdictions, brownfield remediation is carried out in the context of public owner-
ship of the sites themselves. In its simplest form, a public authority simply acquires a site, pays
the cost of remediation, and sells it of to developers or other private agents.
Redevelopment in the Netherlands
Dutch land policy is often characterized by an important role of public ownership and
command-and-control tools. The Netherlands has a “public land development strategy, [that]
involves public purchase, ownership and servicing of land and active planning for land use
before land is released for actual development to the private sector. This guarantees building
developments according to public policies, it realizes full cost recovery of all public works via
the sale of building plots and it captures at least part of the surplus value of the land after a
change in use” (Van der Krabben and Jacobs, 2013). This model is also applied to brownfield
projects and requires strategic land acquisitions prior to regeneration. Categorized as a public
comprehensive top-down model: a public body (usually the municipality) acquires the land for
future development, services that land and re-parcels it into building plots that can be sold of for
cost recovery and value capture. For further reference, see Van der Krabben and Jacobs (2013),
which also discusses the potential risks associated to this type of top-down approach to land use
and re-development policies.
An example of a large scale regeneration project carried out by public authorities acting as
leaders in the development process can be found in the recent regeneration of areas within the
Rotterdam inner-city harbour. The national government provided a 31 million euros subsidy
for this purpose, which adds to other 27 million from a public fund and additional municipal
resources. Municipalities, who lead the project, were allowed to modify zoning laws to ac-
commodate this redevelopment. While the endeavour is publicly controlled, private parties are
actively incorporated to cover for the additional costs at an early stage. The municipality and
Havenbedrijf Rotterdam first acquire the subsidies, permits, property management, and spatial
legislation before the project was commissioned to private developers. The regeneration project
includes housing development, revitalising economic activity in the harbours, and investment in
the local innovation system.
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Chicago - Brownfields Initiative
The City of Chicago launched the Brownfields Pilot in 1990 with a 2 million investment
from General Obligation Bonds to redevelop brownfield sites. The pilot project was a success,
and was leveraged into the Brownfields Initiative in 1993 with additional loan guarantees from
the US Department of Housing and Urban Development and funds from the EPA. The city’s De-
partments of Environment, Planning and Development coordinates the program in collaboration
with several other organisations. The initiative recycles neglected properties to reuse the land
for the creation of green and open areas, affordable housing, office space and economic redevel-
opment. The City acquires contaminated sites to add to the city’s investment portfolio. After the
sites have been assessed, enrolled in Illinois EPA’s Site Remediation Program and cleaned, the
sites are marketed by the City for redevelopment.
Since 1990 funding for brownfields redevelopment has been leveraged from several sources:
2 million USD from the General Obligations Bonds, 74 million from the HUD Section 108 Loan
Guarantee, $691.000 from the Brownfields Showcase Community Designation, etc. 33
Urban Planning Tools
In some cases planners try to use planning guidelines to provide incentives for brownfield re-
development. This can involve relaxation of planning restrictions (as in the case of the Rotterdam
harbour mentioned above), tightening of restrictions on planning development or a combination
of both.
United Kingdom - Brownfield First & Green Belts
The Brownfield First policy was launched in 1998 with the goal of ensuring that 60% of new
urban development in the United Kingdom happens within the urban footprint. The argument
motivating the policy is that developers do not pay the social cost of greenfield development
because local governments are the ones in charge of providing transportation, sanitation and
other infrastructure. Presumably, the cost of providing this infrastructure is much lower for
properties located within the urban footprint. The policy led local authorities to factor these
priorities into their planning guidelines (for example in Local Development Frameworks). By
2008, 80% of developments was happening on previously developed land sites.
Another British planning policy that was crucial in directing new development to PdL sites
is the widespread use of urban greenbelts. These were introduced in London in 1935 and gen-
33For further reference, see Higgins (2008) and https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en.html.
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eralized for other cities in the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act. This sets out an area -
the greenbelt - around cities where development is forbidden. Greenbelts cover roughly 12% of
England and are usually placed around urban areas. They are meant to contain sprawl, operate
as a sort of urban lung and safeguard the countryside among other uses. Its presence is a highly
debated issue, as many authors argue that green belts amount to a tight restriction on urban
residential construction which results in high housing prices Cheshire (2014). The combined
imposition of greenbelts and the brownfield first policy implies most new development in the
United Kingdom effectively happens on previously developed land. For further reference, see
Dixon and Adams (2008) and Mace et al. (2016).
Netherlands - “Ladder for Sustainable Urbanization”
The Dutch minister of Infrastructure and Environment introduced the “ladder for sustainable
urbanization” in 2012. This process requires planning agencies to go through three steps before
planning approval. Municipalities or regional government organizations have to first document
there is demand for new development in their area. If, even accounting for current and future
supply, demand for development is still identified, then the agencies pushing for development
should identify appropriate sites, giving priority to sites in existing urban areas. If, for example
because of high re-development costs, development cannot take place in existing urban areas,
the planning application moves to the third step. Approval for greenfield development can be
provided if no financially viable site within the city is available and a good case can be made.
Using the ladder to justify actions is obligatory, even though compliance is not monitored or
enforced by the central government. The general guidelines are simple but can lead to very
different arguments depending on the context.
One of the goals of this policy framework is to ensure that a proper case is made before
development happens outside of brownfield land. It also attempts to ensure an efficient use of
urban land (were the term efficient is loosely defined) and promote densification of existing
urban areas. For further reference, see Salet (2014).
65
References
Adams, David, Christopher De Sousa, and Steven Tiesdell. 2010. “Brownfield development:
A comparison of North American and British approaches.” Urban Studies, 47(1): 75–104.
Ahfeldt, Gabriel, and Elisabetta Pietrostefani. 2017. “The Economic Effects of Density: A
Synthesis.” Spatial Economics Research Centre, LSE.
Black, Sandra E. 1999. “Do better schools matter? Parental valuation of elementary education.”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(2): 577–599.
Blanden, Jo, Paul Gregg, and Lindsey Macmillan. 2007. “Accounting for intergenerational
income persistence: noncognitive skills, ability and education.” The Economic Journal,
117(519).
Brueckner, Jan K. 1987. “The structure of urban equilibria: A unified treatment of the Muth-
Mills model.” Handbook of regional and urban economics, 2: 821–845.
Burchfield, Marcy, Henry G Overman, Diego Puga, and Matthew A Turner. 2006. “Causes
of sprawl: A portrait from space.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2): 587–633.
Cheshire, Paul. 2014. “Turning houses into gold: Don’t blame the foreigners, it’s we Brits who
did it.” Centrepiece, 19(1): 14–18.
Cheshire, Paul C. 2006. “Resurgent cities, urban myths and policy hubris: what we need to
know.” Urban studies, 43(8): 1231–1246.
Cohen, Rachel, Javier Garciadiego, Tyler Gumpright, Rose Martinez, and Sam Levy. 2016.
“Evaluation of the New York State Brownfield Opportunity Areas Program.” NYU Robert F.
Wagner Graduate School of Public Service.
Comission, European. 2013. “Science for the Environment Policy. Themathic Issue: Brown-
field Regeneration.” Directorate-General Environment, European Comission.
De Leeuw, Frank, and Nkanta F Ekanem. 1971. “The supply of rental housing.” The Ameri-
can Economic Review, 61(5): 806–817.
Dell, Melissa. 2010. “The persistent effects of Peru’s mining mita.” Econometrica, 78(6): 1863–
1903.
66
Dixon, Timothy, and David Adams. 2008. “Housing supply and brownfield regeneration in a
post-Barker world: is there enough brownfield land in England and Scotland?” Urban Studies,
45(1): 115–139.
Duranton, Gilles, and Matthew A Turner. 2016. “Urban form and driving: Evidence from US
cities.” Processed, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
Gamper-Rabindran, Shanti, and Christopher Timmins. 2011. “Hazardous waste cleanup,
neighborhood gentrification, and environmental justice: Evidence from restricted access cen-
sus block data.” The American Economic Review: P&P, 101(3): 620–624.
Gamper-Rabindran, Shanti, and Christopher Timmins. 2013. “Does cleanup of hazardous
waste sites raise housing values? Evidence of spatially localized benefits.” Journal of Envi-
ronmental Economics and Management, 65(3): 345–360.
Gibbons, Stephen, Stephen Machin, and Olmo Silva. 2013. “Valuing school quality using
boundary discontinuities.” Journal of Urban Economics, 75: 15–28.
Glaeser, Edward, and Joseph Gyourko. 2018. “The economic implications of housing supply.”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 32(1): 3–30.
Glaeser, Edward L, and Joseph Gyourko. 2005. “Urban decline and durable housing.” Journal
of Political economy, 113(2): 345–375.
Glaeser, Edward L, Joseph Gyourko, and Albert Saiz. 2008. “Housing supply and housing
bubbles.” Journal of Urban Economics, 64(2): 198–217.
Glaeser, Edward L, Joseph Gyourko, and Raven E Saks. 2006. “Urban growth and housing
supply.” Journal of Economic Geography, 6(1): 71–89.
Green, Richard K, Stephen Malpezzi, and Stephen K Mayo. 2005. “Metropolitan-specific
estimates of the price elasticity of supply of housing, and their sources.” The American Eco-
nomic Review, 95(2): 334–339.
Greenstone, Michael, and Justin Gallagher. 2008. “Does Hazardous Waste Matter? Evidence
from the Housing Market and the Superfund Program.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
951–1003.
67
Gyourko, Joseph, and Raven Molloy. 2015. “Regulation and housing supply.” In Handbook of
regional and urban economics. Vol. 5, 1289–1337. Elsevier.
Higgins, Jessica. 2008. “Evaluating the Chicago Brownfields Initiative: The Effects of City-
Initiated Brownfield Redevelopment on Surrounding Communities.” Northwestern Journal of
Law & Social Policy.
Hilber, Christian AL, and Wouter Vermeulen. 2016. “The Impact of Supply Constraints on
House Prices in England.” The Economic Journal, 126(591): 358–405.
Hornbeck, Richard, and Enrico Moretti. 2015. “Who Benefits from Productivity Growth?
The Local and Aggregate Impacts of Local TFP Shocks on Wages, Rents, and Inequality.”
Mimeo.
Horrace, William C, and Ronald L Oaxaca. 2006. “Results on the bias and inconsistency of
ordinary least squares for the linear probability model.” Economics Letters, 90(3): 321–327.
Kiel, Katherine A, and Michael Williams. 2007. “The impact of Superfund sites on local
property values: Are all sites the same?” Journal of Urban Economics, 61(1): 170–192.
Mace, Alan, Fanny Blanc, Ian Gordon, and Kath Scanlon. 2016. “A 21st century metropoli-
tan green belt.”
Malpezzi, Stephen, and Duncan Maclennan. 2001. “The long-run price elasticity of supply
of new residential construction in the United States and the United Kingdom.” Journal of
Housing Economics, 10(3): 278–306.
Newey, Whitney K. 1987. “Efficient estimation of limited dependent variable models with en-
dogenous explanatory variables.” Journal of Econometrics, 36(3): 231–250.
OECD. 2012. Compact City Policies: A Comparative Assessment. Matsumoto, Tadashi and
Sanchez-Serra, Daniel and Ostry, Adam.
Ooi, Joseph TL, and Thao TT Le. 2013. “The spillover effects of infill developments on local
housing prices.” Regional Science and Urban Economics, 43(6): 850–861.
Owens, Raymond E, Esteban Rossi-Hansberg, and Pierre-Daniel G Sarte. 2017. “Rethink-
ing Detroit.” Unpublished Paper.
68
Paciorek, Andrew. 2013. “Supply constraints and housing market dynamics.” Journal of Urban
Economics, 77: 11–26.
Pagano, Michael A, and Ann O’M Bowman. 2000. Vacant land in cities: An urban resource.
Center on Public and Metropolitan Policy.
Rossi-Hansberg, Esteban, Pierre-Daniel Sarte, and Raymond Owens III. 2010. “Housing
externalities.” Journal of Political Economy, 118(3): 485–535.
Saiz, Albert. 2010. “The geographic determinants of housing supply.” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 125(3): 1253–1296.
Salet, Willem. 2014. “The ladder of sustainable urbanization.” disP-The Planning Review,
50(4): 4–5.
Turner, Matthew A. 2005. “Landscape preferences and patterns of residential development.”
Journal of Urban Economics, 57(1): 19–54.
Van der Krabben, Erwin, and Harvey M Jacobs. 2013. “Public land development as a
strategic tool for redevelopment: Reflections on the Dutch experience.” Land Use Policy,
30(1): 774–783.
Zahirovich-Herbert, Velma, and Karen M Gibler. 2014. “The effect of new residential con-
struction on housing prices.” Journal of Housing Economics, 26: 1–18.
69
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
 
1548 Nick Bloom 
Brian Lucking 
John Van Reenen 
Have R&D Spillovers Changed? 
1547 Laura Alfaro 
Nick Bloom 
Paola Conconi 
Harald Fadinger 
Patrick Legros 
Andrew F. Newman 
Raffaella Sadun 
John Van Reenen 
Come Together: Firm Boundaries and 
Delegation 
1546 Jörg Kalbfuß 
Reto Odermatt 
Alois Stutzer 
Medical Marijuana Laws and Mental Health in 
the United States 
1545 Maria Molina-Domene Specialization Matters in the Firm Size-Wage 
Gap 
1544 Jonathan Colmer Weather, Labor Reallocation and Industrial 
Production: Evidence from India 
1543 Andrew B. Bernard 
Esther Ann Bøler 
Swati Dhingra 
Firm-to-Firm Connections in Colombian 
Imports 
1542 Gerard H. Dericks 
Hans R.A. Koster 
The Billion Pound Drop: The Blitz and 
Agglomeration Economics in London 
1541 Andrew B. Bernard 
Andreas Moxnes 
Networks and Trade 
1540 Does Gentrification Displace 
Poor Households? An 
‘Identification-Via-
Interaction’ Approach 
Sevrin Waights 
1539 Zhuan Pei 
Jörn-Steffen Pischke 
Hannes Schwandt 
Poorly Measured Confounders Are More 
Useful On the Left than On the Right 
1538 Konstantin Büchel 
Stephan Kyburz 
Fast Track to Growth? Railway Access, 
Population Growth and Local Displacement in 
19th Century Switzerland 
1537 Stephen Gibbons 
Maria Sánchez-Vidal 
Olmo Silva 
The Bedroom Tax 
1536 Pawel Adrjan 
Brian Bell 
Pension Shocks and Wages 
1535 Tom Kirchmaier 
Stephen Machin 
Matteo Sandi 
Robert Witt 
Prices, Policing and Policy: The Dynamics of 
Crime Booms and Busts 
1534 Laurent Bouton 
Paola Conconi 
Francisco Pino 
Maurizio Zanardi 
Guns, Environment and Abortion: How 
Single-Minded Voters Shape Politicians 
Decisions 
1533 Giulia Giupponi 
Stephen Machin 
Changing the Structure of Minimum Wages: 
Firm Adjustment and Wage Spillovers 
1532 Swati Dhingra 
Rebecca Freeman 
Eleonora Mavroeidi 
Beyond Tariff Reductions: What Extra Boost 
From Trade Agreement Provisions? 
1531 Doruk Cengiz 
Arindrajit Dube 
Attila Lindner 
Ben Zipperer 
The Effect of Minimum Wages on Low-Wage 
Jobs: Evidence from the United States Using a 
Bunching Estimator 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7955 7673 Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Website: http://cep.lse.ac.uk Twitter: @CEP_LSE 
